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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ANONYMITY: FREE
SPEECH, DISCLOSURE AND THE DEVIL
TODAY there is a recognized right to speak and write anonymously and to
participate anonymously in group activities. The Supreme Court has developed
this right as a derivative of the protection given speech, assembly, the press,
religion, and petition by the first and fourteenth amendments. Several members
of the Court have, however, denied that the Constitution guarantees a "freedom
of anonymity."' These Justices, joined by some distinguished and civil liberty
minded commentators, have doubted the wisdom of granting constitutional
protection against compulsory disclosure of expression and association, since,
they assert, disclosure implements rather than defeats the goals of the first
amendment.2 This school argues as follows: the attainment of truth is the goal
of the first amendment; the disclosure of a source of argument is necessary to
an honest evaluation of its truth in the market place of ideas; disclosure,
therefore, best effectuates the policy of the first amendment. But other scholars,
who also assume the so-called truth or market place theory, argue that dis-
closure often deters free expression and therefore defeats the goals of the first
amendment.3 This Comment, after examining the history and present case law
of anonymity, will evaluate these conflicting claims and in so doing it will
directly challenge the market place theory of the first amendment.
Anonymous writings have long played an important role in the expression
of ideas. Anonymous pamphlets have been used in England since the beginning
of printing.4 The English licensing laws brought forth a series of anonymous
religious tracts.5 John Udall, an Anglican clergyman with Puritan views, was
convicted in 1590 for writing unlicensed pamphlets attacking the bishops under
the pen name "Martin Marprelate."' 6 In 1637 the licensing laws were amended
to require that all books bear the name of the author as well as the printer,
1. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
2. E.g., id. at 67; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CommiTTEE oN CIVnL RIGHTS, To SEcuRE
THEsE RIGHTS 52 (1957); Fly, Full Disclosure: Public Safeguard, 168 NATION 299
(1949) ; Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda-The Method of
Exposure, 10 U. CHi. L. REv. 107, 108 (1943) ; Smith, Democratic Control of Propaganda
through Registration and Disclosure, 6 PuB. Op. Q. 27, 31 (1942).
3. See Hays, "Full Disclosure": Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATION 121 (1949) ; Robi-
son, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 CoLum.
L. REv. 614, 635-37 (1958) ; Comment, 66 YA.LE L.J. 545, 560-66 (1957).
4. COURTNEY, THE SEcmrs OF OUR NATIONAL Lrr ATURE 33-34 (1908).
5. CHATEE, THE BI SSINGS OF LIBERTY 192 (1956).
6. Id. at 192-97.
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and to regulate the importing of books. 7 John Lilburn and John Wharton,
working men of Puritan views, were convicted of contempt in 1638 for re-
fusing to say whether they had smuggled books from Holland into England.
8
The licensing laws expired in 1694,9 and the device of anonymous authorship
continued to be utilized in English political life; Defoe, Swift and Johnson,
as well as many lesser known authors, published anonymous political pam-
phlets critical of affairs in England.'0 During the early history of the United
States prominent persons used anonymous pamphlets and the unsigned letter
to the editor to express their views on public issues. William Bradford was
brought to trial because he had, in order to inform the people of their rights,
anonymously printed and distributed the charter of Pennsylvania." At the
time the first amendment was adopted, the device of anonymous political
authorship was well known, and utilized by many of the founding fathers.
The Federalist papers of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were published orginally
as letters to the editor under the name of "Publius.' 2 The Letters of Pacificus
by Alexander Hamilton defending Washington's proclamation of neutrality
and Madison's answering Letters of Helvidius were published anonymously., 3
Even Chief Justice Marshall, writing anonymously as "a friend to the Re-
public," vigorously defended certain Supreme Court decisions against attacks
by Spencer Roane, also writing anonymously.1 4 Between 1789 and 1809 no
fewer than six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and
thirty-four congressmen published political writings either unsigned or under
pen names.15
But throughout history governments have sought to limit or abolish the
right of an individual to express himself anonymously, by requiring those
engaged in the expression of ideas to register or in some other way to disclose
their identity. In 1850 France enacted a requirement that newspaper articles
discussing political, philosophical, or religious questions be signed. 16 England
7. Holdsworth, Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 29 YALE
LJ. 841, 848 (1920).
8. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 197-205 (1956).
9. Holdsworth, note 7 supra at 849, 855.
10. See COURTNEY, THE SECRETS OF OUR NATIONAL. LITERATURE 151-77 (1908).
11. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 206 (1956).
12. See BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST i (1948).
13. GAiNEs, POLITICAL WORKS OF CONCEALED AUTHORSHIP 47 (1959).
14. See 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIn oF MARSHALL 313-19 (1919).
15. Id. at 9.
16. ANoN X ous JouRNAIms 21 (1855).
This provision was soon after amended to apply to
all articles of whatever length, published in political or nonpolitical papers, in which
articles the acts or opinions of persons and individuals or collective interests shall
be discussed.
Id. at 3.
Analogous disclosure provisions appear in the current code.
Art. 1. Regardless of its form of organization, any periodical publication must:
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in 1881 adopted a requirement that the printers and publishers of unincor-
porated newspapers file annually the title of the paper and the names of its
proprietors.17 Similarly, in the United States, both the state and federal gov-
1. Inform the public of the names and qualifications of the persons assuming its
direction de jure or de facto.
2. Include a technical committee in accordance with article 16 of this ordinance.
2. For the purpose of this ordinance, the term "publication" will mean any news-
paper, magazine, information brochure or sheet, not strictly scientific, artistic, tech-
nical or professional, appearing at regular intervals at least once a month.
4. Any person convicted of having lent his name to the proprietor, co-proprietor or
financial backer of a publication in any way, and especially by means of signing up
for stock or any interest in a publishing enterprise, will be punished by 3 months to
2 years in prison and by a fine, the minimum of which will be 300,000 francs and
the maximum a sum equal to fifty times the amount of his investment, of his pur-
chase or of his hidden loan.
The same penalties will be incurred by the person in whose profit the operation
of name lending will have been performed.
If this name lending operation is made by a company or society, the penal re-
sponsibility envisaged by the present article extends to the president of the adminis-
trative council or the managing director depending on the type of society or company.
5. Each issue of the publication must, at the top and under the title bear the names
of the publisher and of the co-owners if there are any. If the enterprise is a company,
the names of the members of the board, of the partners or their responsible deputies
will be mentioned in like fashion.
In each case, the name will be followed by the indication of the person's profes-
sion and nationality.
In the case of a company, once every three months, one issue of the publication
will give a complete list of the owners, with their addresses and qualificat;on. If the
publication is owned by more than 100 partners, this list will be limited to the names
of the 100 partners who have the largest holdings in the business; and the list of
other partners will be supplied each quarter to the Bureau of Information, where it
will be available to the public on request.
At the same interval, an issue of the publication will give a complete list of editors,
regular and occasional ones.
In case of violation of one of the above provisions the publisher will be sentenced
for 6 days to 6 months imprisonment and to a fine of 30,000 to 300,000 francs, or to
either of them.
6. In the case of a company of stockholders, stocks Will necessarily be nominative.
Their transfer will be subject to the approval of the board of directors. No founder's
share will be created.
10. Authors using a pseudonym must indicate in writing, before publication of their
articles, their real names to the publisher.
In the case of an action against the author of an article, unsigned or signed with
a pseudonym, the publisher's professional secrecy is wavered at the request of the
prosecuting attorney in charge of the complaint to whom he will disclose the author's
true identity....
Ordinance of Aug. 26, 1944, Code P6nal 643-45 (Dalloz French ed. 1959).
17. Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 60, §§ 1, 8, 9, 13;
see PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GREAT BrrAIN AND THE COMIIONWEALTH
566 (1952). See generally id. at 561-68. Similarly a penalty is imposed on any printer or
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ernments have enacted disclosure provisions. For example, the Post Office
Appropriations Act of 1912 required users of second class mailing privileges
periodically to file and publish the names of their officers and proprietors.1 8
The federal government compels lobbyists 19 and agents of foreign govern-
ments 20 to register. Any group which is found by the Security Activities
Control Board to be a "communist action group" must submit a membership
list.1 Some organizations have been required by state statutes to disclose to
the state the names of their members ;22 persons and groups wishing to use
parks and streets for meetings and public speeches have been required to
publisher who does not print his name and residence on every paper or book. The News-
papers, Printers, and Reading Rooms Repeal Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 24, § 1, reenact-
ing 2 & 3 Vict., c. 12 (1839), § 2. This section attempts to assist the identification of
libelers. See 48 L.J. 41 (1913). The same statute further requires that each printer keep
a copy of every paper he prints for six months and that he write on this copy the name
and address of the person or persons who employed him to print it. Newspapers, Printers,
and Reading Rooms Repeal Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 24, § 1, reenacting the Unlawful
Societies Act, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 79, § 29.
18. Post Office Appropriation Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 554 (1912)
(now 39 U.S.C. § 4369, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3492-93 (Sept. 15, 1960)); see
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) (construing and validating statute).
19. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70
(1958) ; see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
20. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 56 Stat. 248 (1942), as amended, 22
U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1958) ; see Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) (dictum).
21. Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993-95 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 786
(1958). Section 8 of the Act requires each member of a Communist-action organization
to register if either the organization fails to register or if his name is omitted from the list
of members filed. Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1958).
Section 10 declares it unlawful for a registered organization
(1) to transmit or cause to be transmitted, through the United States mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, any publication which
is intended to be, or which it is reasonable to believe is intended, to be dissemi-
nated among two or more persons, unless such publication and any envelope,
wrapping, or other container in which it is mailed or otherwise circulated or
transmitted, bears the following ... with the name of the organization appearing
in lieu of the blank: "Disseminated by , a Communist organization" ;
or
(2) to broadcast or cause to be broadcast any matter over any radio or television
station in the United States, unless such matter is preceded by the following state-
ment, with the name of the organization being stated in place of the blank: "The
following program is sponsored by ,, a Communist organization."
Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1958). The validity
of an order directing the Communist Party to register is before the Supreme Court this
term. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, Oct. term 1960, No. 12.
For a history of the litigation see EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 415-19 (2d ed. 1958) ; 6 Civil Liberties Docket ff 211.1 (Nov. 1960).
22. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63 (1928); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 181 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. La.),
prob. juris. noted, 364 U.S. 869 (1960).
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register ;2 and, in some instances, state laws have required authors to sign
their works.2
.In a number of cases such provisions have been challenged in the Supreme
Court as violating freedom of expression. While early cases reaching the Court
upheld such requirements, in recent years the Court has found some forms of
compulsory disclosure invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments.2 r
THE CASE LAW OF ANONYMITY
The Early Cases-Disclosure Requirements Upheld
The first governmental disclosure case to reach the Supreme Court was
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan,26 which challenged the registration and pub-
lication provisions of the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912.27 The act
required "every newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication" to file
with the Postmaster General a list of its editorial and business officers and its
proprietors, and to publish this information twice annually.28 Under the terms
of the act any delinquent publication was to be "denied the privileges of the
mail."'29 Lewis argued that since the denial served no post office function it
was a regulation of the press, not the mail, and was therefore outside congres-
sional powers over postal matters.30 Moreover, Lewis asserted that the first
amendment expressly forbids the exercise of such power, for "[b]y compelling
a public disclosure of the editors and owners of newspapers, the right to dis-
seminate ideas impersonally is destroyed."31 The Court, by construing the
phrase "privileges of the mail" to mean only the privilege of being classified as
second class matter,32 avoided the broad question of congressional power to
require disclosure as a condition to using the mails. 33 It then held that since
23. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 286:2 (1955).
24. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1714 (1949) ; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 781(b); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Page 1960); Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06
(1936).
25. Compare Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), with Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). Compare New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63 (1928), with Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960), and Alabama ex rel. Patterson v. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
27. Post Office Appropriation Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 554 (1912)
(now 39 U.S.C. § 4369 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3492-93 (Sept. 15, 1960)). This
provision was based on rules and regulations promulgated by the Postmaster General dat-
ing back to 1887. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 306 & n.1 (1913). These
rules and regulations did not, however, provide for the publication of such information.
28. Post Office Appropriation Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 554 (1912).
29. Ibid.
30. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1913).
31. Id. at 292.
32. Id. at 301-12 (looking to language, administrative background and legislative
history of the act). See also 29 Ops. An9'Y GEN. 550 (1912).
33. Id. at 316.
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second class matter was carried at a considerable loss, and thus reflected a
government subsidy 34 designed to promote the dissemination of knowledge,35
Congress could place functionally related conditions on the granting of such
subsidies. 3 The Court accepted the congressional theory that disclosure ad-
vanced knowledge by preventing deceptive propaganda and therefore held that
since the requirements were reasonably related to the purpose of the second
class privilege, they were within congressional power.87 Reflecting a now out-
dated view of the first amendment,38 the court seemed to feel that since Article
One gave Congress the power to make these restrictions, the provisions was
valid regardless of what effects it might have upon freedom of the press.39
The next disclosure case to reach the Court-New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman 4 ---raised the question of whether the fourteenth amendment
gave members of the Ku Klux Klan a right of anonymity. In 1923, New York
passed a statute forbidding all corporations and associations of more than
twenty members, which required an oath as a condition of membership, from
delivering any anonymous writings to non-members. Each such group was also
34. [L]etter mail. . . is subjected to a rate eighty times higher than that given
newspapers under the second class .... [A] very great discrimination also exists
against the other classes and in favor of the second class.
Id. at 304.
35. Id. at 312-13.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 315-16.
38. Morgan was decided seven years before the first of the World War I espionage
act cases.
39. The Court asked:
Was the provision intended simply to supplement the existing legislation relative to
second class mail matter or was it enacted as an exertion of legislative power to
regulate the press ... ?
229 U.S. at 303.
The Court found that Congress had the power to grant a subsidy and that the dis-
closure requirement was limited to publications subsidized. Id. at 309-14. The Court then
asked whether "the conditions ... exacted [were] incidental to the power exerted of con-
ferring on the publishers of newspapers, periodicals, etc., the privileges of the second class
classification.... [T]he illuminating rule announced in McCulloeh v. Maryland and Gib-
bons v. Ogden governs here .... " Id. at 314. The court stated that only if the condition
was not incidental did it infringe freedom of the press. Ibid. The Court thus seemed to
adopt Alexander Hamilton's view of the amendment; to Hamilton, no first amendment was
needed since no power to regulate the press was delegated. THE FEDEa.IST No. 84, at 631-
32 (Hamilton ed. 1871) (Hamilton); see Hart, Power of Government Over Speech and
Press, 29 YALE L.J. 410-12 (1920).
The narrow construction given the statute by Lewis suggests that the Court sensed a
difference between a ban on all the mail-which might be characterized as a denial of a
"right"-and a disqualification from the second class subsidy-the revocation of a "privi-
lege." Lewis might thus be read as holding that the first amendment does not affect the
granting or denial of governmental "privileges," whatever its impact may be on "rights."
In view of the Court's conception of the function of the first amendment, however, this
reading of Lewis does not seem tenable.
40. 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
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required to file with the Secretary of State copies of its constitution, by-laws,
a list of members and officers and any resolutions which dealt with the group's
political and lobbying activities. Delinquent associations were subject to fine,
and any member who knowingly remained in an organization which failed to
comply was guilty of a misdemeanor.
4'
The Ku Klux Klan failed to register or disclose any of the required informa-
tion.42 Bryant, a Klan official, was indicted for retaining membership in the
Klan with the knowledge that it had failed to comply with the statute.43 Bryant
filed a petition of habeas corpus, claiming that the statute was invalid under
the fourteenth amendment.4 New York denied the petition,4 r and, on appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed. 46 The court rejected the argument that a citizen
has a "privilege and immunity" of anonymous membership in an oath bound
organization by virtue of his United States citizenship. 47 Nor did the Court
think that by subjecting Bryant's right of membership in the Klan to "rightful"
regulation, the state denied him due process of law.48 The Court concluded
that disclosure in this case was a "rightful" state regulation on the two-fold
theory that
the State within whose territory and under whose protection the asso-
ciation exists is entitled to be informed of its nature and purpose, of whom
it is composed and by whom its activities are conducted 4
and that
requiring this information to be supplied for the public files will operate
as an effective or substantial deterrent from the violations of public and
private right to which the association might be tempted if such a disclosure
were not required.r0
The Court may have found support for the second assertion in the nature of
the Klan, which it assumed to be the object of the legislation."
41. N.Y. Civz RIGHTS LAW §§ 53-56. Benevolent orders listed in the N.Y. BENEVOLENT
ORERs LAW § 2 and labor unions were explicitly exempted from the requirements of the
act. N.Y. C-'n RIGHTS LAW § 53. In 1947 the attorney-general was given, in addition,
injunctive remedies. N.Y. Cwrm RIGHTS LAW § 57.
42. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 71 (1928).
43. See Record, pp. 9-10, 20, New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, supra note 42.
44. 278 U.S. at 65.
45. People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 241 N.Y. 405, 150 N.E. 497 (1926).
46. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented; he would have dismissed the writ of error on
jurisdictional grounds. 278 U.S. at 77.
47. Id. at 71-72. ("If to be and remain a member of a secret, oath-bound association
within a State be a privilege arising out of citizenship at all, it is an incident of state rather
than United States citizenship....").
48. Id. at 72.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Addressing itself to the question whether the statute's regulation of only oath-
bound organizations was a reasonable classification the Court emphasized the "manifest
tendency" of the Klan to use the secrecy surrounding its purposes and membership as a
"cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare." 278 U.S. at
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In two cases involving state regulation of streets and parks the Court, in
effect, broadened the area in which at least some disclosure may be required.
In the cases of Cox v. New Hampshire 52 and Poulos v. New Hampshire 53
the Court upheld licensing requirements which apparently required at least
some disclosure as a condition to holding a parade on the public streets or
holding a meeting in a public park, although neither case discussed the extent
of the disclosure required.54 The right anonymously to use such facilities for
public expression was therefore denied by the Court.
Following Cox but prior to Poulos, the Court decided an anonymity case
involving the compulsory registration of foreign agents. In the period just
before World War II agents of the fascist nations were disseminating vast
amounts of propaganda in the United States.'5 Apparently believing that
75. For this finding it relied heavily on testimony given at Congressional hearings that the
Klan believed in "white supremacy" and "punished what some of its members thought to
be crimes." Id. at 76-77.
The statute appears to have been an attempt indirectly to outlaw the Klan. See Robin-
son, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLU.
L. REv. 614, 643 nn.151 & 152 (1958). Although argued in the briefs, see Brief for Plain-
tiff-in-Error, pp. 35-36, Brief for Attorney General of the State of New York, pp. 14-15,
Brief for Defendants in Error, pp. 15, 23-24, the deterrence problem was not discussed in
the Court's opinion.
52. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
53. 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
54. Both cases arose under a New Hampshire statute providing that
No theatrical or dramatic representation shall be performed or exhibited, and no
parade or procession upon any public street or way, and no open-air public meeting
upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted, unless a special license there-
for shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or from a licensing com-
mittee for cities hereinafter provided for.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 286:2 (1955). In Cox a unanimous Court sustained the conviction
of five Jehovah's Witnesses for holding a parade on a public street without securing the
required license. The Court found that licensing was necessary to prevent traffic disorders
and conflicting parades. 312 U.S. at 576. See generally 2 EMERSON & HADER, POLITICAl.
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 797-98 (1958). Because the statute was narrow-
ly drawn to achieve this end-it did not restrict use of placards, distribution of handbills,
or discussion, 312 U.S. at 575-and because it left the licensing board no discretion to dis-
criminate between applicants on the basis of what was to be advocated, id. at 576, the Court
concluded that the requirement for prior licensing was a reasonable regulation of use of
the streets, and did not unconstitutionally curtail freedom of expression. In Poulos, the
court upheld the provision of the New Hampshire statute requiring registration prior to use
of public parks. Poulos was convicted for making a religious address in the face of a denial
of a license. State v. Poulos, 97 N.H. 352, 88 A.2d 860 (1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
The court rejected Poulos' argument that the statute on its face infringed free speech.
Finding, as it had in Cox, that the act properly construed left licensing officials no discre-
tion, it upheld the provision on the ground that some system for the allocation of public
facilities was essential to maintenance of effective speech. 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953). Justices
Black and Douglas, while agreeing that a purely ministerial statute would be valid, dis-
sented, in part because they did not believe the statute to in fact be ministerial. 345 U.S. at
424-26.
55. See Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method
of Suppression, 37 ILL. L. REv. 193-97 (1942).
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identification of these individuals as foreign agents would permit the public to
discount their propaganda,56 Congress enacted a series of disclosure statutes,
5 7
one of which 58 required any person acting as an agent of a foreign principal
to register with the Secretary of State and to disclose, among other things, the
terms of his contract, his compensation under it, and the names of those who
have contributed to his compensation.5 9 The act further required the filing of
supplemental registration statements.6 Viereck, a registrant, was tried for
failure to give information in supplemental registration statements about cer-
tain propaganda activities, including speech-writing and the publication of
translations of books authored by the Deutche Infornzationsstelle of Berlin.16
Viereck was convicted upon an instruction that conviction could result whether
the activities were engaged in "on behalf of his foreign principal or principals
or on his own behalf."6 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that
under the statute the Secretary could require disclosure only of activities
engaged in on behalf of a foreign principal. 63 Viereck v. United States 0 4 is
principally interesting for the dissent of Justices Black and Douglas. 5 They
urged that the statute should be construed in light of the congressional pur-
pose of turning "the spotlight of pitiless publicity" upon the propaganda
activities of foreign agents. Mr. Justice Black specifically stated his approval
56. See Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda-The Method
of Exposure, 10 U. Ci. L. REv. 107, 111-12 & n.20 (1943); Smith, Democratic Control
of Propaganda Through Registration and Disclosure, 6 PuB. OP. Q. 27 (1940).
57. For a description of the statutes enacted and their effectiveness in achieving the
goals Congress sought see Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda
-The Method of Exposure, 10 U. Cm. L. Rtv. 107 (1943).
58. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631, as amended, ch.
521, 53 Stat. 1244 (1939) (now ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 (1942), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1958).
59. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, § 2, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 632.
60. The supplemental registration statements were to bring the original filing up to
date and in addition to disclose
(b) The amount and form of compensation received by such person for acting as agent
for a foreign principal which has been received during such six months' period
either directly or indirectly from any foreign principal; and
(c) A statement containing such details required under this Act as the Secretary shall
fix, of the activities of such persons as agent of a foreign principal during such
six months' period.
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, § 3, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 632, as amended, ch. 521,
53 Stat. 1245 (1939).
61. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1943).
62. Id. at 240.
63. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943). The majority based its interpreta-
tion on the specific language of section 3 (c) which directed that supplemental registration
statements contain "such details required as the Secretary shall fix, of the activities of such
person as agent of a foreign principal," see note 60 suepra (emphasis added), and upon the
absence of congressional history indicating intent to require broader disclosure. See 318
U.S. at 244-47. 16
64. 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
65. Id. at 249.
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of the principle of required disclosure as "resting on the fundamental constitu-
tional principle that our people adequately informed, may be trusted to dis-
tinguish between the true and the false. . . "6 He argued that the statute
was "intended to label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers
may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinter-
ested source. Such legislation implements rather than detracts from the prized
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.
' '67
Towards a Right to Anonymity
The Court that decided Viereck had few doubts as to the constitutionality
of disclosure legislation; the dissent in fact urged the positive virtues of dis-
closure as grounds for a broad reading of the statute. This dissent, the high-
water mark of judicial approval of compulsory disclosure, highlights the shift
that was to take place in the post World War II period. Two years after
Viereck came the first case invalidating a disclosure law.6 And in the following
fifteen years the Court has dealt with a broad range of disclosure requirements,
which on first and fourteenth amendment grounds, it has either invalidated 
69
or construed narrowly.70 The Court has never specifically articulated this
action as recognition of a "right" of anonymity. But analysis of the Court's
treatment of disclosure laws impinging on expressional freedoms indicates a
growing awareness that disclosure may destroy these freedoms as effectively
as an outright ban.
The shift came with Thomas v. Collins.71 Thomas, president of the United
Auto Workers, traveled to Houston to deliver an organizational address to
non-union employees. Prior to his speech, he was served with an ex parte
order restraining him from soliciting members until he had registered as a
labor organizer and secured an organizer's card from the Secretary of State.
The Texas statute required such registration as a condition to any solicitation of
members; the statute provided for the automatic issuance of cards to anyone
giving his name, union affiliation, and credentials.7 2 Despite the restraining
order Thomas addressed the meeting, closing his speech with a general invita-
tion to persons present to join a named local, and specifically invited one
member of the audience by name. For these actions he was tried for contempt
66. Id. at 251.
67. Ibid.
68. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
69. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) ; Alabama ex rel. NAACP v. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
70. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41 (1953).
71. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
72. TEx. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a § 5 (1947). But see 323 U.S. at 541 n.24.
The Court-finding registration itself to be invalid-did not consider it necessary to deter-
mine whether the restraint imposed went beyond requiring previous identification. Id. at
541.
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and sentenced to a fine and imprisonment. Finding that the speech in question
-despite its economic nature and exhortative quality-was protected by the
Constitution, the Court reversed the conviction holding that the requirement
of prior registration was "incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free
speech and assembly, '73 where failure to register resulted in a penalty. As
long as the conduct is not something beyond speech, such as collection of funds,
registration cannot be required. 74
Although ambiguities in the Thomas opinion leave its scope in doubt, it
may be read as a recognition of a right of anonymity. No reason is given to
explain the Court's implicit holding that registration restrains speech. Argu-
ably, the possibility of delay inherent in even the most automatic procedure
might be a restraint. But, as the statute is aimed soley at professional organ-
izers who could foresee the requirement, it is doubtful that such delay would
result in postponement of speech. Moreover, the Court stated that the re-
straint involved was only the requirement of "previous identification or
registration," and did not mention delay. 75 An alternative reading of the opin-
ion may, however, be offered. Thomas argued that a disclosure requirement
in labor relations would sometimes deter speech, since disclosure may subject
organizers to employer reprisals ;76 the Court was thus aware of the practical
impact of the statute. This reading is supported by the fact that the Court
invalidated the statute not only as personally applied to Thomas, but generally
as applied to speakers advocating union membership. 77
73. Id. at 539.
74. Rutledge distinguished dicta in several earlier cases which had suggested that a
state might "protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent," Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (dictum) (invalidating imposition of licensing re-
quirement on solicitors of funds for religious causes), as involving free speech plus conduct.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945).
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy concurring emphasized that once a man uses "the
economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he
is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment." Id.
at 543-44. Justice Jackson also concurred, categorizing Thomas's activity as "making a
public labor speech" rather than practicing a vocation as solicitor. Id. at 548.
75. Id. at 541.
76. Brief of Appellant, pp. 46-47. See also Hearings on Labor Management Relations
in the Southern Textile Industry, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (account of pressures used
to combat unionization).
77. The Court refused to pass on "any other application [of the statute] than that
made upon the facts of this case." This might be read as invalidating only the application
of the statute to Thomas. But the Court in Thomas v. Collins also stated
We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a pub-
lic speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the
requirements of the first amendment.
323 U.S. at 540. In Poulos the Court distinguished Thomas as a case in which the statute
was construed to prohibit the making of "labor speeches anywhere on private or public
property without registration" was held unconstitutional. 345 U.S. at 414. And Thomas
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The next test of disclosure laws involved federal regulation of lobbying.
In two cases decided shortly after Thomas, the Court indicated that the first
amendment does not prevent Congress from requiring of lobbyists who have
direct contact with legislators, registration, disclosure of their principals, and
an accounting of receipts and expenditures. At the same time, the Court sug-
gested that broader regulation of lobbying would raise serious constitutional
questions. In the first case, United States v. Runtely,78 Rumely, secretary of
the Committee for Constitutional Government, was cited for contempt of
Congress because he refused to disclose to the House Select Committee on
Lobbying Activities the names of certain individuals who had purchased books
from him.79 The Court of Appeals reversed the citation; and the Supreme
Court speaking through Justice Frankfurter affirmed the reversal, without
reaching the constitutional issue by construing the congressional authorizing
resolution 80 to permit only an investigation of "buttonhole" lobbying, not the
grass roots type of lobbying involved in the Ruinely case. The Court felt that in
view of the guarantees of the first amendment a serious constitutional issue
would be raised if the resolution were construed to sanction the investigation
of "all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books
and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may
exert upon the ultimate legislative process."8' Justices Douglas and Black
thought that the resolution could not be so narrowly construed but concurred
with the majority on first amendment grounds.8 2 They argued that to require
a publisher or author such as Rumely to disclose purchasers and readers of
his works would discourage free inquiry, for anticipating public censure and
future governmental action, individuals may "fear to read what is unpopular,
what the powers-that-be dislike."'8 3 The concurrence argued that since Cong-
has generally been so construed. See, e.g., Comment, 43 MicH. L. Rv. 1159, 1162 (1945);
45 CoLU m. L. Ry. 465, 466 (1945) ; 31 VA. L. REv. 691, 694 (1945).
Viewed generally, and not in its particular application to Thomas, it is clear that al-
though the burden of waiting to register may deter some speech, the chief impact of the
requirement in a period of labor-management turmoil would be to keep organizers from
registering at all. As applied to Thomas there was neither delay nor disclosure. Since
Thomas had planned his speech in advance, 323 U.S. at 520-21, he could easily have secured
an organizer's card before speaking. Since Thomas's speech was publicized, ibid., there
was no question of disclosures attendant to procuring such a card deterring him from
speaking.
78. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
79. Specifically the names of those who had made bulk purchases of books for further
distribution in amounts of more than $500. See 345 U.S. at 49-54 (concurring opinion) ;
Record, pp. 3-4. For an account of the background of the case see H.R. REP. No. 3024, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ; TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 140-47 (1955).
80. The resolution empowered the committee to investigate "all lobbying activities in-
tended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation... "' 345 U.S. at 44.
81. Id. at 46. See also Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
aff'd, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
82. 345 U.S. at 48.
83. Id. at 57.
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ress could not by statute penalize speech, it could not through a statute re-
quiring disclosures "hold a club" over speech and the press. Feeling that the
investigative powers were equally limited they concluded that Congress could
not initiate an inquiry into these matters backed by the contempt power.
In United States v. Harris,8 4 decided a year later, the Court sustained the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act s5 which provided in broad terms for
disclosure and regulation of lobbying activity. All individuals, organizations
and corporations collecting or spending money to aid "the passage or defeat
of any legislation by . . . Congress" or to "influence, directly or indirectly"
passage or defeat of such legislation were required to disclose names of con-
tributors and recipients of funds.8 6 In addition the statute provided that all
persons paid to influence the passage or defeat of any congressional legislation
must register, give the name of their employer, and financial data.87 The dis-
trict court, holding that the statute was unconstitutional, dismissed an informa-
tion brought under it.88 On direct appeal by the government the defendants
claimed that statutory language defining the act's coverage was too vague to
84. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
85. 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958); see Comment, 56 YA.LE L.J. 304,
316-25 (1947).
86. Section 305 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act required
Every person (defined in § 302(c) to include individuals, partnerships, committees,
associations, corporations, and organizations] receiving any contributions or expend-
ing any money for the purposes designated in subparagraph (a) or (b) of section
307 shall file ... a statement containing...
(1) the name and address of each [contributor] ... of $500 or more ...
(3) the total sum of all contributions made...
(4) the name and adress of each person to whom an expenditure . . . of $10
or more has been made . . . and the amount, date, and purpose of such
expenditure;
(5) the total sum of all expenditures made....
60 Stat. 840-41 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 264 (1958). Section 307 provides
The provisions of this title shall apply to any person . . . who ... solicits, collects,
or receives ... any ... thing of value to be used principally to aid, in the accom-
lishment of any of the following purposes:
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by... Congress ....
(b) To influence directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation
by ... Congress....
60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1958).
87. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, § 308, 60 Stat. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 267
(1958). The disclosures required include an accounting of receipts and expenditures, as
well as the purposes and recipients of any disbursement. Ibid.
88. Two individual defendants, Moore and Linder allegedly having arranged to have
members of Congress contacted either by their own emissaries or through an artificially
stimulated letter writing campaign were charged with failure to register under § 308. De-
fendants Moore and Harriss were charged under § 305 with failure to report expenditures
both of compensation to others to communicate face-to-face with members of Congress
and of the costs of a letter-writing campaign. Finally the information charged the National
Farm Committee with failure to report the solicitation and receipt of contributions to in-
fluence the passage of legislation. See 347 U.S. 612, 613-17 (1954) ; Record, pp. 1-23.
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meet the demands of due process, and that the substantive provisions violated
the first amendment.
The Court avoided the vagueness attack by construing the statute to extend
only "to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or pro-
posed federal legislation. '8 9 It also rejected the contention that the disclosure
provisions contravened the first amendment, since the statute as construed did
not directly deter the exercise of first amendment rights and the information
was necessary to evaluate pressures placed on Congress.9 °
Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson dissented. Justices Black and Douglas
agreed that Congress had the power to require disclosure of the real principals
behind lobbyists who come to Congress "and speak as though they repre-
sent the public interest." 91 But, they argued, the statute was so vague that
persons would be deterred in the legitimate exercise of first amendment rights
because of uncertainty over what the statute prohibits. Moreover, they thought
Congress had intended to require the registration of persons paid to influence
Congress by influencing public opinion as well as "button-holing" and that
as written by Congress a considerable question under the first amendment
was posed.
2
Anonymity and Legislative Inquires: "Void For Vagueness" Under the First
Amendment
Between 1957 and 1960 the Court in a series of cases dealing with legislative
inquiries into speech and association sketched the contours of the right of
anonymous organizational membership. The decisions explicitly recognized
that compulsory disclosure of thought and association could and often did
invade the liberties protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. In some
89. 347 U.S. at 620. For a discussion of the scope of "lobbying" so defined see text
accompanying notes 231-33 infra. The majority also read the substantive provisions of §§
305 and 308 as applying only to those "persons" defined in § 307. Thus, the Court limited
§ 305, which unlike § 303 contained no such express limitation, to persons who "directly
or indirectly" solicit, collect, or receive money either to influence "directly or indirectly"
or to aid the passage or defeat of legislation. In so construing the statute the Court relied
upon statements in both the House and Senate reports that § 307 defined the application of
the act. See 347 U.S. at 620 n.9.
90. The majority reasoned that if Congress were properly to evaluate pressures placed
on it, it needed to know "who is being hired, who is. putting up the money, and how much."
347 U.S. at 625.
91. Id. at 632.
92. Id. at 632-33. Jackson alone expressed the -view that as'construed there was doubt
whether the statute "does not permit applications which would abridge the right of petition
.... " Id. at 636. He rested his agreement that Congress could regulate lobbying for hire
and require lobbyists to disclose their principals, their activities, and their receipts on his
characterization of lobbying for hire "as a business or profession." Ibid. Compare Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). Thus, while demonstrating
a diversity of opinion on the approach to these two cases, all the justices agreed that paid
lobbyists who have direct contact with legislators may be required to register and disclose
their principals, receipts, and expenditures.
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cases-where the investigation involved Communism-a majority of the Court
found these inroads justified by an overriding governmental interest.0 3 In other
cases, however, the Court found that the infringements of political freedom
caused by compulsory disclosure were sufficiently grave to require careful
scrutiny, under the due process clause, of the legislative authorization for the
investigation.9"
The companion cases of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,95 and Watkins v. United
States 96 reflect this interplay of first amendment liberties and the due pro-
cess clause. In Sweezy, which involved a contempt conviction for refusal to
identify members of the Progressive Party 9r and to disclose the contents of
a lecture given at the state university, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for four
members of the Court, questioned whether there was any state interest suffi-
ciently strong to warrant such interference with first amendment freedoms.
Since the legislature might lack the constitutional authority to require Sweezy
to answer, due process required the resolution directing the investigation to
be sufficiently definite so that a court could determine whether the legislature
really wanted this information. Because the authorizing resolution was "sweep-
ing and uncertain" the court was forced to assume that the legislature really
had no interest in the information sought and it therefore declared that the
use of the contempt power violated due process. 98 Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan concurred in voiding the conviction, arguing that Sweezy's freedom of
speech and association guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment had been
unjustifiably infringed.99 To these Justices the "inviolability of privacy belong-
ing to a citizen's political loyalties" far outweighed the meager interest the
state derived from the danger the Progressive Party posed to its security. 1°°
93. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959).
94. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957).
95. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
96. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
97. At the hearings Sweezy denied that he had ever been part of any program to over-
throw the government by force or violence, or had ever known members of the Communist
Party in New Hampshire. Record, p. 21.
98. 354 U.S. at 254. The grounds of decision are dictated by an unwillingness to hold
that the state lacked power where the decision could be placed on other grounds. Compare,
e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955) ("From a very early date, this Court has
declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of decid-
ing it. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 553.") ; United States v. Rume-
ly, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) (construing a resolution to avoid constitutional question).
99. 354 U.S. at 255 (1957).
100. Id. at 265. Similarly, they felt that "the grave harm resulting from governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university" clearly outweighed the contention of
the state that the curtailment of expression was limited to situations in which the legis-
lative committee had reason to believe that the violent overthrow of the government was
being advocated or planned-particularly since Sweezy had denied ever advocating the
forceful overthrow of the government. Id. at 260-61.
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They emphasized further that the massive proof which justified regarding the
Communist Party as something different from a conventional political party
did not exist in the case of the Progressive Party.
0 1
In Watkins a witness had been sentenced for contempt because of his refusal
to disclose to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Act-
ivities whether certain persons had been members of the Communist Party.
The Court found that first amendment freedoms were threatened by the com-
mittee's investigation in two ways: community scorn and pressure may be
brought to bear on those forced to reveal membership in unpopular organiza-
tions or sympathy with minority views, and at the time it may deter other
persons from joining such groups or expressing such views.' 0 2 It therefore
reasoned that the due process clause of the fifth amendment required a clear
congressional delegation of authority to ask these questions, so that witnesses
could judge their pertinence. 0 3 The Court concluded that this criterion had
not been met in Watkins, and therefore the conviction was invalid.
In Barenblatt v. United States the Court reiterated the proposition that the
first amendment protects an individual from compulsory disclosure of asso-
ciational relationships, but limited the principle by holding that the individ-
ual's interest in associational privacy was outweighed by the governmental
interest when the subject of inquiry was the Communist Party.' ° 4 Sustaining
the convictiotn of Barenblatt for refusing to tell the House Committee on Un-
American Activities whether he was or had ever been a Communist, the Court
held that such information was essential for the preservation of the government.
The Court distinguished Sweezy on the ground that the questions asked of
101. Id. at 266.
102. 354 U.S. at 197-98.
103. Id. at 198, 205. Where first amendment freedoms are involved the Court applies
a stricter standard of vagueness. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10
(1948) ; Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67, 75 nn.39 & 40 (1960) (collecting authorities) ; cf.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (construing statute narrowly to eliminate
vagueness and restraints on expression). A vague statute having a potential inhibiting
effect on expression has the vice that "persons at the fringes of amenability to regulation
will rather obey than run the risk of erroneous constitutional judgment" See Note, supra
at 80 (1960). Watkins should not be made to guess at whether the Committee's inquiries
are pertinent lest he be deterred from refusing to answer where he has a right to refuse to
answer. In this respect Watkins differs from cases like Sweezy. The Court's objection in
Sweezy was not that Sweezy would have to guess whether the questions were pertinent but
rather that the Court was itself unable to tell whether the legislature wanted the informa-
tion demanded.
104. 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959). Barenblatt has been followed in two cases involving the
conviction of critics of the committee for contempt for failure to disclose whether they
were members of the Communist Party. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) ;
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961). The first amendment issues involved in
these cases were agreed by both the majority and the dissent to be the same as the issue in
Barenblatt and consequently no extended analysis of the first amendment issues was given.
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 413-14, 416-17 (1961) ; Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1961) (dissent).
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Sweezy related to the Progressive Party, which the Court had found not to
be subversive.10 5 Justices Black and Douglas, and Chief justice Warren dissent-
ed, arguing that the committee could not use indirect means such as "exposure,
obloquy, and public scorn" to achieve results clearly prohibited by the first
amendment.106
L'envoi: The Mind of the Court
A comparison of the reason given by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan for
concurring in Sweezy with the position taken by them in Barenblatt seems to
indicate that to them the critical factor in determining whether an investigative
committee may compel disclosure of the names of members of an association
is the extent to which the group in question has been linked with the Com-
munist Party. Where a nexus, however, is not established they apparently
consider the right of the state to disclosure subordinate to the "right of a
citizen to political privacy." Mr. Chief justice Warren, and Justices Black,
Douglas, and Brennan indicated by their dissent in Barenblatt that even in
the case of the Communist Party the compulsory disclosure of the names of
party members infringes first amendment rights. 07 Thus, by concurrence
and dissent six members of the Court have expressed some recognition of a
right of associational anonymity, at least under certain circumstances. Despite
the broad language of these six justices in concurrence and dissent, the form
105. 360 U.S. at 129. In a companion case, Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), the
same majority sustained the contempt conviction of Uphaus for his failure to produce the
guest list of the World Fellowship Association's summer camp. The majority found that
the record revealed a sufficient "nexus between World Fellowship and subversive activities"
to show that the investigation was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation. 360 U.S.
at 79. The majority concluded that the governmental interest in self-preservation out-
weighed the individual's rights in associational privacy. Id. at 79-80.
106. 360 U.S. at 140-41. See generally id. at 163-66. Brennan took a similar position
dissenting in Uphaus:
For in an era of mass communications and mass opinion, and of international ten-
sions and domestic anxiety, exposure and group identification by the state of those
holding unpopular and dissident views are fraught with such serious consequences
for the individual as inevitably to inhibit seriously the expression of views which
the Constitution intended to make free.
360 U.S. at 84.
Black also criticized the Court's apparent holding "that the ordinary rules and require-
ments of the Constitution do not apply because the committee is merely after Communists."
360 U.S. at 146.
107. That subversives are treated by the Court as forming a special category is further
indicated by those cases in which the Court has sustained requirements that public em-
ployees as a condition of employment disclose whether or not they are Communists. See
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 719 (1951) (sustaining ordinance requir-
ing every employee to execute an affidavit "stating whether or not he is or ever was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. .. .") ; cf. Beilan v. Board, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (sustaining
the dismissal of a teacher for lack of frankness in refusing to answer whether he had been
a member of the Communist Political Association).
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which the holdings in Sweezy, Watkins, and Barenblatt took left open the
question whether the Court would invalidate a disclosure requirement phrased
in unmistakably clear language.
Recognition of a Right to Anonymity
An answer to this question was provided by two cases testing the power of
southern states to compel the NAACP to produce membership lists for govern-
mental scrutiny. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 108 arose out of a
state investigation of the organization's alleged failure to comply with a statute
requiring registration of foreign corporations doing business in the state.
Pursuant to a motion by the state, the NAACP produced records of its
activities, but refused to turn over its membership lists. For this refusal, the
NAACP was convicted of contempt. On appeal to the Supreme Court, how-
ever, the conviction was reversed. The Court found that to compel an in-
dividual to disclose his membership in this group would restrain his freedom
of association; the history of this organization demonstrated that disclosure is
likely to induce members to withdraw and to dissuade others from joining.
The attitude toward the group in certain areas creates a fear of exposure of
their beliefs and the consequences which might flow from such exposure. 10 9
The Court then looked to see whether the state's interest in securing this
data might justify the restraint. The NAACP had produced much of the de-
sired information, including the names of paid employees and officials. In
view of this, the court found that disclosure of the names of rank and file
members had no "substantial bearing" on the issue raised in the hearing,"10
and therefore the state's interest was insufficient to justify the infringement
on freedom of assembly.
In Bates v. City of Little Rock I" the court extended these protections to
NAACP contributors. It voided a conviction for failure to comply with a
statutory requirement-passed in 1957 as an amendment to Little Rock's
licensing tax provisions-that organizations operating in the city file lists of their
contributors, members, and other data." 2 Noting that the information did
not seem to be related to the taxing provisions, the court found that the
108. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
109. The Court buttressed its conclusion by reference to evidence "that on past occa-
sions revelation of the identity of ... rank-and-file members has exposed these members
to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifesta-
tions of public hostility." 357 U.S. at 462. The Court rejected Alabama's contention that
the NAACP lacked standing to assert the constitutional rights of its members. The Court
pointed out that it was inconsistent to say that a member had a right to withhold his con-
nection with an association and at the same time to require that he personally assert the
right, since in asserting the right he would be disclosing his connection with the organiza-
tion. Id. at 458-60. Compare Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953).
110. 357 U.S. at 464.
111. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
112. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 10638, Oct. 14, 1957, and North Little Rock, Ark.,
Ordinance 2683, Oct. 14, 1957.
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state's interest was insufficient to warrant the clear imposition 113 on asso-
ciational freedom. Thus the Court made it clear that disclosure was a vice in
itself, which could not be cured by resort to clear statutory language, and
that the right of anonymity applied to statutory requirements and court orders
as well as to committee inquiries. While NAACP v. Alabama attempted to
distinguish the Bryant case, which had upheld New York's requirement that
the Klan file membership lists, the rationale of this opinion, as well as the
Bates opinion, severely undercuts the earlier validation of disclosure."
4
Following the two NAACP cases, the Court in Talley v. California"5
struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance which prohibited public distribu-
tion of handbills unless they bore on their face the name and address of the
author, publisher, and distributor. 116 Talley was convicted under the statute.
The Court stated that under past decisions a complete prohibition of the
distribution of handbills would be invalid ;117 thus the Los Angeles ordin-
ance-since it was not narrowly drawn to reach only handbills which are
obscene, offensive or which advocate unlawful conduct "s8 -could be justified
only if saved by the qualification that suitably labeled pamphlets could be
circulated. But the Court compared compulsory disclosure with outright pro-
hibition and concluded that since identification and fear of reprisal might
deter peaceful discussions of public matters of importance the Los Angeles
ordinance was void on its face for infringing the freedom of expression. Mr.
Justice Harlan concurred'-"9 arguing that in the absence of a showing as to
the city's experience with the distribution of obnoxious handbills, the city
could not suppress the circulation of all anonymous handbills in order to
identify the distributors of obnoxious handbills. justices Clark, Frankfurter
and Whittaker dissented. 120 The dissenters distinguished the NAACP cases
on the ground that "the record is barren of any claim, much less proof, that
he [Talley] will suffer any injury whatever by identifying the handbill with
113. At the trial evidence was offered to show that many former members had declined
to renew their membership because of the existence of the ordinance and that persons
identified as members had been subjected to harassment and to threats of bodily harm. 361
U.S. at 521-22.
114. The Court clearly rejected the implication of Zimmerman that the effect of dis-
closure would be to restrain unlawful acts, to an organization which like the Klan or the
Communist Party engaged in unlawful conduct. 357 U.S. at 465. Finally the Court sug-
gested that the decision in Zimmerman may rest upon the failure of the Klan to supply
any of the data sought by the state, although the Zimmerman Court placed no emphasis
on this factor. Id. at 465-66. In summary, the NAACP cases appear to have limited Zim-
mnermnan to its particular facts: an organization which engaged in unlawful conduct and
which had failed to supply any of the information required by the statute.
115. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
116. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06 (1946).
117. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 146 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
118. 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. at 67.
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his name. '121 The dissenters asserted that the Constitution accorded no "free-
dom of anonymous speech," noting past instances in the areas of lobbying
and second class mailing where the Court had approved of such disclosure
requirements. They argued that the ordinance did no more than create in
writing that responsibility which is present in public utterance.
In the most recent case developing the right of anonymous association,
Shelton v. Tucker, 22 the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute 123 which
required every teacher to file annually an affidavit listing every organization
to which he had belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five
years. The statute was tested by teachers who asserted that they belonged to
no subversive organizations. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart
stated two broad principles governing the case. First, that the state had a
right to investigate the competence and fitness of those who teach in its
schools and that these inquiries were relevant to the fitness and competence
of the teachers of Arkansas. Secondly, that to compel a teacher to disclose
his every associational tie would impair that teacher's right of free association.
The Court pointed out that the statute did not provide that the information
be kept in confidence. But even if there were no disclosure to the general
public, "the pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease
those who control his professional destiny would be constant and heavy."'2 4
This is especially true in Arkansas, where teachers have no tenure and can
be dropped from employment at the end of the school year without notice or
hearing. The Court then stated the question for decision narrowly: whether
Arkansas could compel all of its teachers to disclose all of the organizations
with which they had been associated during the preceding five years. The
majority argued that even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, the means chosen for implementing that purpose must be
narrowly drawn so as not to stifle fundamental liberties more than necessary.
Since in the view of the majority the affidavit requirement, although relevant,
was "unlimited and indiscriminate" in sweep and went "far beyond what
might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the
fitness and competency of its teachers," the statute was held to infringe the
freedom of association protected by the fourteenth amendment. 2 5 Justices
Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker dissented.
Summary
Despite broad language stressing the conflict between compulsory dis-
closure and first amendment rights, the scope of that right of anonymity
established by the actual holdings is limited. Talley bars a state from requiring
121. Id. at 69.
122. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
123. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1229 (1960).
124. 364 U.S. at 486.
125. Id. at 490.
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the names of the distributors or authors to be printed on the face of all hand-
bills. The NAACP cases by analogy suggest that a state cannot require such
information to be filed with a state official. Under Morgan, however, news-
papers may be required to disclose the names of their officers and owners in
order to receive the benefits of the second class mailing privileges. Thomas
v. Collins establishes that as a general proposition individuals may not be
required to register with public officials before speaking in a private hall.
But a lobbyist who directly contacts members of Congress for pay may be
required under the Harris case to register and give the name of his principal.
And similar information may be required from an agent of a foreign govern-
ment. Numerous dicta suggest that a solicitor may be required to identify
himself before soliciting funds.126 The scope of the right of anonymous mem-
bership in or contribution to an association is particularly indeterminate.
Shelton v. Tucker established that a state might not require all teachers to
disclose all of the groups to which they belong. The NAACP cases establish-
ed as a minimum that the state could not require all organizations to disclose
their membership lists. In narrowly limiting Bryant in terms of the unlawful
activities of Klan members the Court indicated a somewhat broader scope
of the right. And any organization which employs lobbyists who by direct
contact with Congressmen attempt to influence the passage or defeat of
legislation may be required to register and to disclose the names of contribu-
tors of more than $500. An organization may also be required to register
before holding a meeting in a public park or holding a parade on a public
street. Furthermore, the early cases validating disclosure requirements, though
seeming to conflict in philosophy with more recent decisions, have not been
overruled or, with the exception of Bryant, expressly limited.
Many questions are left unanswered by the cases establishing the right to
anonymity. The Talley court specifically refused to consider whether a more
narrowly drawn statute-for example, one limited to handbills issued by
a business-would be valid. Harris, by narrowly construing the lobbying
act, avoided deciding whether Congress could extend the statute to indirect
lobbying if the language were clear. For an understanding of how far the
Court should extend the right of anonymity, it is necessary to consider the
justification for asserting such a right.
DISCLOSURE OR ANONYMITY? TEE MARKET PLACE OF IDEAS REAPPRAISED
At the heart of the Court's recognition of a right of anonymity lies the
belief that compulsory disclosure may deter the expression of ideas and the
.126. 'Without a doubt a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he pur-
ports to represent." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (dictum) ; accord,
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (dictum) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (dictum).
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participation in associations both of which are protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments. 2 7 This position has evoked sharp criticism. It is
sometimes said that disclosure does not necessarily have this deterrent
effect. 2 8 More frequently, however, some deterrence is admitted but it is




The Court's recognition that the deterrent effect of disclosure may result
in an infringement of freedom of speech seems to reflect an extension of the
rationale behind the cases voiding subsequent punishment for speech and
prior restraint as violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. In the
1920's, when the first significant free speech cases were being litigated, it was
widely believed that the first amendment forbade only prior restraint on
speech.' 30 This view stems from Blackstone, who defined the liberty of the
press as consisting "in laying no previous restraints upon publications and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.' 13' In a series
127. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) ; Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 65 (1960) ; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-24 (1960) ; NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). Freedom of association for the
purpose of airing grievances is part of the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the first
and fourteenth amendments. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) ;
see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958). Some have sug-
gested that the freedom of assembly spoken of in the first amendment may have been
understood by the framers to refer primarily to ad hoc assemblies called for specific pur-
poses. See Robison, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of Member-
ship, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 614, 619 (1958). But the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly
interrelate to protect the free expression of ideas-both orally and in print-to insure the
right of the people collectively to pursue these ends and to seek favorable action from the
government. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ; Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937);
Robison, Protection of Associatims From Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58
COLUm. L. REv. 614, 619 (1958). In a mass society group activity is virtually the only
means by which an individual may make his voice heard. See CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF
LmERTY 150-51 (1956) ; Abernathy, The Right of Association, 6 S.C.L.Q. 32, 41-42 (1953) ;
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 546 & n.7 (1957). The liberties protected by the first amend-
ment against infringement by the federal government are protected by the fourteenth
amendment against infringement by the states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (religion) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (speech and press);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly).
128. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 67, 69 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
129. See text at notes 30-31 supra.
130. See CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 68 (1956).
131. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES 151-52 (8th ed. 1778). The Blackstonian definition
was adopted by Mr. Justice Holmes in dismissing for want of jurisdiction a writ of error
from a conviction for contempt. Patterson v. Colorado ex reL. Attorney General, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907) (dictum). Several lower Courts followed Blackstone's deilnition in early
contempt proceedings and prosecutions for libel. Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 269
(Pa. 1805) ; Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
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of cases delineating the boundaries of the first amendment, the Court indicated
that it would not follow the Blackstonian view.132 This position was articulated
in Chief justice Hughes famous dictum in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.133
Quoting COOLEY oN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 13 4 Hughes said "The
liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the
phrase itself a by-word, if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he
pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless
publications.' 135 The opinion implies that because subsequent punishment could,
through its deterrent effect, achieve the same results as prior censorship, it too
was forbidden by the first amendment. This view was confirmed in a series of
later cases which struck subsequent punishment laws as being repugnant to the
first and fourteenth amendments.13 6 In Grosjean v. American Press Co.137
where the Court held invalid a tax on certain newspaper corporations, Mr.
Justice Sutherland also quoting Cooley declared "The evils to be prevented
were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government
by means of which it might prevent ... free and general discussion of public
matters .. ."38 Similarly, in other cases focusing on the deterrent effects
of disclosure, the Court seems to be saying that the prohibition against sub-
sequent punishment and against prior restraint might be put to naught if an
identical repression of free speech could be achieved by putting "the pitiless
132. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (dictum) ; Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (dictum). Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919), gave his clearest statement of his about face.
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment
left the common law as to seditious libel in force....
Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction
of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command,
"Congress shall make no law. .. abridging the freedom of speech.
133. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
134. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 885 (8th ed. 1927).
135. 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
136. E.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937). Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
137. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
138. Id. at 249-50. (Emphasis added.) This language appears in the paragraph im-
mediately subsequent to the one quoted in Near. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
886 (8th ed. 1927). Language identical both to that quoted in Near and in Grosjean ap-
peared in the seventh edition of Cooley's work which antedated the 1919 decisions. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 603-04 (7th ed. 1903). That Chafee in his influential 1920
volume on free speech urged a similar view is additional evidence of the thinking that
underlay the decision that subsequent punishment was prohibited. Chafee argued that "A
death penalty for writing about socialism would be as effective suppression as a censor-
ship." CHAFEE, FREEDom OF SPEECH 10 (1920). To the framers of the Constitution, he
argued, freedom of speech meant not only security against prior executive restraint but also
security against legislative restraint by means of subsequent punishment, Id. at 21. A
similar view w6s expressed by Madison, 4 ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TioN 569 (1836) ; and most recently by Mr. Justice Douglas, Douglas, Censorship and
Prior Restraint, in THE FIRST FREEDOm 41, 43 (Downs ed. 1960).
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spotlight of publicity" on individuals exercising their rights of expression
and association.
Of course, such an extension-from restraint and punishment to disclosure
-would have been unwarranted unless disclosure did in fact deter expression
and association. Not even the critics of anonymity, however, have been able
to deny that disclosure may in some instances have such an effect.' 39 And
actual instances of the deterrent impact of disclosure laws are legion.140 Such
laws may affect the exercise of first amendment rights in several ways. First,
there is the fear that hostile members of the community or even govern-
mental officials 141 will take reprisals. These reprisals may take many forms-
the most obvious being physical violence. Evidence that persons who had
been publicly identified as members of the NAACP had been threatened with
bodily harm was offered in both NAACP cases.142 Similarly, social ostracism
and economic pressure may make the price of association too high where
membership in unpopular groups must be made public.' 43 And, quite apart from
direct social pressures, the desire to keep out of the limelight might silence
some, who, if they could remain anonymous, would express themselves.
Privacy is highly regarded in American society ;144 in a number of jurisdic-
tions, privacy has been accorded the status of a common-law right. 45 More-
139. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 67, 69 (1960) (dissenting opinion) ; In-
stitute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Exposure, 10
U. CHI. L. REv. 107, 131-32 (1943).
140. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1960) ; Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, 163-66 (1959) (appendix to opinion of Black, J., dis-
senting) ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) ; United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 48, 57-58 (1953) (concurring opinion).
141. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) ; United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41, 48, 57 (1953) (concurring opinion).
142. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama
cx rtl. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
143. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960) ; Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1960) ; CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 149-52 (1956) ; CoUT-
NEY, THE SECanS OF OUR NATIONAL LITERATURE 33-34 (1908) (".... the fear of com-
promising relations or friends, or bringing discredit on oneself, has often led to the use of
a pseudonym.") ; Hays, "Full Disclosure": Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATION 121 (1949) ;
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1957) ; Note, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 589, 604 (1948). Com-
pare Franklin, Infamy and Constitutional Civil Liberties, 14 LAw. GUILD REV. 1 (1954).
The House UnAmerican Activities Committee has indicated repeatedly in its reports that
it conceives its purpose as one of "turning the light of pitiless publicity" on organizations
and individuals who engage in activities which the committee deems "inimical to our
American concepts." The Committee boasts of the organizations it has crippled and the
individuals-both in government and in private employment-it has caused to be fired. See
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, 163-66 (1959) (appendix to opinion of
Black, J., dissenting, collecting statements by House Un-American Activities Committee).
144. The right to be let alone was characterized by Mr. Justice Brandeis as the right
"most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Dykstra, "The Right Most Valued By Civilized Man,"
6 UTAH L. REv. 305 (1959).
145. See Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 Norm DA ME LAw. 499, 505 (1952)
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over, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that privacy is one of
the values protected by the fourth amendment.1 46 The high regard the
American people have for their privacy, suggests the possibility that its de-
nial may deter expression and association.1 4
7
A particularly pernicious aspect of disclosure legislation is its selective
deterrence. On its face a disclosure law may be impartial, aimed at all groups
and viewpoints. This apparent impartiality may, however, mask actual dis-
crimination against unpopular ideas. 1 48 The major sources of deterrence are
social and economic pressure; these are most effective when they reflect, and
are reinforced by, the majority sentiment of the community. Those who ad-
vocate popular views, who express the ideas of the majority or dominant
groups, have little to fear from disclosure laws. Any reprisals against such
popular views may bring down the wrath of the whole community. The rebels
and heretics, on the other hand, typically get no such support. They must
bear the full brunt of disclosure and the concomitant community sanctions.
For the advocate of popular views the "light of pitiless publicity" is the spot-
light thrown on a favored performer; for the dissenter it is the harsh glare
(listing jurisdictions). This right is founded upon the direct harm to the feelings of the
individual; Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Pri-
vacy, 30 So. CAL. L. RFv. 280, 291 (1957); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 H~Av. L. REv. 193, 196-98 (1890) ; Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 499, 506 (1952) ; and is based upon the recognition that the mental pain and distress
flowing from an invasion of privacy may be far greater than could be inflicted by bodily
injury. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890).
The right of privacy was founded on the view that every person had a common law right
of determining which of his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions should be communicated
to others. Id. at 198.
146. The fourth amendment "marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values of
our civilization... "' McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) ; see Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709 (1948); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959)
(dictum); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (dictum). Similarly, Dean Griswold has
advanced the thesis that the right to be let alone is at the heart of the fifth amendment;
that the fifth amendment is a means of protecting individuals holding unorthodox beliefs
from governmental prying. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216
(1960).
147. See Hays, "Full Disclosure": Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATiON 121 (1949).
One aspect of the invasion of privacy deserves special mention. There is a common feeling
that some matters are so personal that no other person has a right to know them. The
Court in Sweesy recognized this when it suggested that "merely to summon a witness and
to compel him, against his will, to disclose the nature of his past expressions and associa-
tions is a measure of governmental interference in these matters." Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (dictum). In response to protests the Census Bureau dropped
from the 1960 census an inquiry into religious beliefs. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1960, p. 33, col.
1. Yet the information taken on the census is by law confidential. 13 U.S.C. § 214 (1958).
148. "An exposure law applying to all organizations automatically seeks out the un-
popular group as its target." Robison, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Dis-
closure of Membership, 58 COLUm. L. Rev. 614, 635 (1958) ; see Hays, "Full Disclosure":
Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATIoN 121 (1949) ; Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1957).
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of the third degree. Yet it is the rebel and heretic for whom, to a large degree,
the first amendment protections were forged. 1 4
9
The existence of this deterrent effect, therefore, suggests a strong analogy
between subsequent punishment and disclosure legislation. If disclosure, like
subsequent punishment, deters free speech and association it should fall within
the proscription of the first amendment. The analogy, however, is incomplete.
The cases invalidating subsequent punishment held that any expression, unless
it fit into one of several exceptions, 50 came within the area protected by the
amendment and could therefore not be repressed by any means. These cases
seemed to say that it does not matter how the state repressed speech-what-
ever the means-the result is forbidden. This equation cannot necessarily be
drawn in the area of disclosure. The most cogent argument for disclosure
asserts that publicity in itself advances the goals of the first amendment. 151
Since no such claim can seriously be made for subsequent punishment, there
may be reasons, growing out of the rationale underlying the protection of
free expression, which would justify the deterrence ancillary to disclosure yet
not justify restraints by censorship or subsequent punishment.152
Several arguments have been advanced against a right of anonymity. The
most serious is the assertion that disclosure advances the search for truth.153
Secondly, it has been argued that that disclosure only represses irresponsible
ideas.154 Anonymity, it is asserted, will serve as a cloak for the progenitor of
irresponsible ideas; it may encourage the making of unfounded charges which
the author would fear to raise if he knew he would be subject to public censure
were they proven false.15 And finally it has been argued that disclosure cannot
149. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1941); Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 880 (1960); Robison, Protection of Associations From
Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 614, 635 (1958).
150. Speech may be punished upon a sufficient showing under one of several tests of
a causal relation to illegal conduct, see note 237 infra, or on a showing that the punish-
ment was narrowly drawn to control an evil arising from a non-speech aspect of communi-
cation, see notes 235-36 infra, or upon a showing that what is punished is not speech, see
text at note 234 infra.
151. See text at notes 162-66 infra.
152. On this statement of the problem, a consideration of those arguments in favor of
disclosure becomes completely distinct from whether in a particular instance disclosure
may be justified because of the state's interest in activity other than speech. Thus the
problems that gave rise to the clear and present danger, balancing, and speech-plus tests
are not pertinent.
153. See text at notes 162-66 infra.
154. See People v. Arnold, 127 Cal. App. 2d 844, 273 P.2d 711 (Super. Ct. 1954);
State v. Freeman, 143 Kan. 315, 55 P.2d 362 (1945) ; Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa.
Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944); ANONYMOUS JOURNALISM 9, 21 (1855). The President's
Committee on Civil Rights in advocating a disclosure requirement argued that those who
try to stir up racial and religious hatred are reluctant to say who they are because they
know their doctrines have been "morally outlawed" for more than a century and a half.
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CrviL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 51 (1947).
155. See ANONYMous JOURNAISM 18-21 (1855).
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be considered a governmental restraint on freedom of expression since any
sanctions attached to speech are imposed solely by private individuals acting
on their own volition.1 56 The two final objections, however, have slight merit.
The argument that only irresponsible ideas will be hindered rests on a false
premise. Disclosure deters advocates of all unpopular faiths and theories;
yet many of the ideas now widely accepted were once thought to be radical
and dangerous. At one time abolition, woman suffrage, unionization were ad-
vocated by only a few, and scoffed at by the majority. 15 7 Yet these ideas were
not any the less worthy for being unpopular. Thus, it is often the advocate of
change, not the purveyor of unfounded claims or pernicious beliefs, who fears
disclosure.' 5 s Similarly, the argument that disclosure is not governmental re-
pression has slight substance. The theory of the first amendment offers little
justification for a distinction based on whether the injury was governmentally
imposed or privately imposed. Of course, the first amendment restrains only
governmental action.159 But a disclosure requirement is the action of the
government. It is the sine qua non of the repression of expression, 100 and
156. See Brief for Respondent, 2 L. Ed. 2d. 1151, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 448 (1958). This objection was somewhat misleadingly formulated in the
Harriss case as an objection that the only restraint imposed by disclosure on the inter-
action of ideas is self-censorship. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954). Of
course, in so far as fear of reprisals is the operative factor the censorship is self-censorship
exactly to the same extent that any other subsequent punishment is an instance of self-cen-
sorship. What's important is that the punishment is imposed by extra legal authority.
157. See CHAFEE, TE BLESSINGS OF LISERTY 151 (1956). Indeed, any advocate of
substantial change in the existing order will at the outset encounter the strong opposition
of the great majority of men who believe that things are quite all right as they are. See
ibid.
158. See Robison, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of Mem-
bership, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 614, 630 (1958).
159. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1952) (dictum) ; cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ; Barron v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833). For an interesting analysis of the state
action problem see Pollak Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
160. Of course, if the private reprisals were based on information secured by means
other than the disclosure law, this analysis would not apply. But, if the information which
the law demands were sufficiently well known for such a result to occur, it would seem that
a claim of a right of anonymity could not be made at all. In Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the connection between the governmental action and the asserted
illegal result was even more tenuous, at least in so far as the fear of reprisals is the basis
of the right of anonymity. In Brown the state action declared illegal was the separation of
the races in the public schools. Separation does not logically imply inequality. The Court
found, however, that separation on the basis of race did deny Negroes an equal education
because separation "from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494. In other words it
was the psychological effect of the state action on Negro students that made the state action
illegal.
1110 [Vol. 70 :1084
RIGHT TO ANONYMITY
therefore, there is little functional difference between restraint through dis-
closure and restraint through direct governmental sanction.161
The first argument for disclosure, however, retains vitality. Proponents of
this position assert that the volume and skill of modern propaganda make
identification of the source of an argument essential to its evaluation.
1 62
Anonymous propaganda makes it more difficult to identify the self interest
or bias underlying an argument or the qualifications of its exponent. 168 The
use of the "third party technique"--publication of interest group propaganda
under the name of a supposedly impartial "institute" or "foundation"-may
add prestige to an argument, which would lack such prestige were it labeled
as eminating from a vested interest. 16 4 It is therefore argued that exposure of
the source of propaganda will advance the search for truth by permitting a
more critical evaluation of facts, figures, and arguments presented. 65 Since
according to the conventional market place theory the function of the first
amendment is to promote the discovery and dissemination of truth, disclosure
will in this fashion advance the policy underlying the amendment. 66 But for
the market place to produce truth, it would seem that there must be "free
161. The court had little trouble disposing of the argument that the restraint was not
state-imposed. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
162. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 51-53
(1947) ; Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 622-23 (1953);
see CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 109 (1956).
163. See ANONYmOUS JOURNALISM 8-9, 12-13, 20 (1855); FORSTER, ANONYMITY-
AN ENQUIRY 20-21 (1925) ; PRESIDENT'S COMMrrTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SEcuRE THESE
RIGHTS 52 (1947) ; Fly, Full Disclosure: Public Safeguard, 168 NATION 299 (1949) ; In-
stitute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda-The Method of Exposure,
10 U. Cm. L. REV. 107, 108 (1943) ; Smith, Democratic Control of Propaganda through
Registration and Disclosure, 6 PuB. Op. Q. 27, 31 (1942) ; Note, 48 CoLUM. L. REv. 589,
590-91 (1948).
164. For a description of the use of the "third party technique see Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 775-811 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) ; Note, 70 YALE
L.J. 135 (1960). Similarly the anonymous "we" of the newspapers has the sound of rep-
resenting an important segment of opinion. ANoNYmous JOURNALISM 10 (1855) ; FORSTER,
ANO rITY-AN ENQ~uIY 21 (1925).
165. See authorities cited note 163 supra; Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private,
53 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 622-23 (1953). But see FRAINEL, ANONYMOUS (1930); Hays,
"Full Disclosure": Dangerous Precedent, 168 NATION 121, 122 (1949) ("An idea should
stand or fall on its own merits.").
166. Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our people, adequately
informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and the false, the bill is
intended to label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may not
be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested source.
Such legislation [The Foreign Agents Registration Act] implements rather than
detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) ; Ernst & Katz,
Speech: Public and Private, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 620, 622-23 (1953) ; Smith, Democratic
Control of Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure, 6 PuB. OP. Q. 27, 35 (1942);
Note, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 589, 590-91 (1948).
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trade" in ideas. Such at least is the premise of the market place theory." 7
Disclosure requirements may, however, check the free flow of ideas. 108 Thought
that is not offered cannot get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
Furthermore, disclosure chiefly deters the espousal of unorthodox and un-
popular ideas ;169 thus, disclosure provisions may distort the working of the
market. Moreover, disclosure may cause persons with a strong bias against the
source of an argument to reject it regardless of its intrinsic validity. 170
Both arguments-that disclosure tends to promote truth and that anonymity
tends to promote truth-have merit. Each rests on a belief which lies at the
heart of the market place theory: that man, if given the opportunity to choose
freely between competing ideas, will choose wisely,' 71 and that this choice is
meaningful only if based on complete information. 172 But there is conflict
latent in the application of this belief. If truth can be discovered only by the
free trade of ideas, then, clearly, no idea should ever be excluded; any pro-
vision which has the effect of excluding an idea from the market place should
thus be abolished. And if truth can be discovered only by full information,
any provision which promotes such full information should be retained. But
if disclosure-which promotes full information-does have the effect of deterring
and thereby excluding ideas, it is obvious that free trade of ideas and full in-
formation are conflicting values which cannot be achieved simultaneously.
Choice between them would seem to depend on an empirical evaluation of
which most effectively promotes the discovery of truth, which, according to the
market place theory is the goal of the first amendment. No such empirical
evaluation, however, is possible. To determine whether anonymity or com-
pulsory disclosure is more injurious to the discovery of truth it is necessary
to compare the progress towards truth achieved by two societies--or two eras
of the same society--one operating on the disclosure principle, the other per-
mitting anonymous expression. Thus, to know which is more injurious to the
discovery of truth it is necessary to know what is true. Yet the market place
theory is grounded on the premise that any certain knowledge of truth is
impossible.' 73 This paradox, inherent in the market place theory, seems to
167. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
168. See notes 139-47 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text.
170. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 135, 149 (1960). This is the classical fallacy of the argument
ad hominem. See SEALES, LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 145-46 (1948).
171. - Viereck v. United. States, 318 U.S. 236, 249, 251 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Jefferson,
First Inaugural Address in PADoVR, THE COMPLETE JEFFERsoN 384-85 (1943); Letter
from President Jefferson to Judge Tyler, 1804, in THomAs JEFFERSON ON DamocRacy 95
(Padover ed. 1939).
172. MEIRLEJO N, POLrrlcAL FRaEzom 27 (1960); Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and
Private, 53 CoLum. L. IEv. 620, 622-23 (1953) ; Fly, Full Disclosure: Public Safeguard,
168 NATION 299, 301 (1949). ("[E]ven the optimistic Milton did not suggest that truth
could win every fight except in open encounter.").
173. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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lead to an impasse, and to make impossible any resolution of the question
whether disclosure or anonymity is most consistent with the aims of the first
amendment.174 To resolve this question and to determine the desirable scope of
the right of anonymity it is therefore necessary to reevaluate the market place
theory.
The Theory of the First Amendment: Epistomological Scepticism and Free
Competition of Ideas
At the time the first amendment was adopted the freedom to speak was
widely considered a natural right of man.17 5 To Jefferson the right publicly to
express an opinion was not merely a legal right derived from the English
municipal or common law; it was a natural right which no just government
could invade1 76 Jefferson was equally emphatic concerning the value of free
expression as the surest means yet uncovered for discovering the truth,1
7
echoing Milton who had asserted that in a free and open encounter truth was
always the victor over falsehood.'
7 8
With the decline of the natural law theory greater emphasis came to be
placed on this second aspect of the early arguments for freedom of expression:
174. For an illustration of the futility of applying the market place approach to the
problem of disclosure vs. anonymity see Note, 70 YALE L.J. 135, 148-49 (1960), where a
deus ex machina in the form of a model electorate consulting alternative sources is imported
to resolve the balance.
175. Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 620, 621-22 (1953);
see Franklin, Infamy and Constitutional Civil Liberties, 14 LAW. GUILD REv. 1, 2-3 (1954).
In Germany the protection of free expression is today based on a higher law. CASTBERG,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 414 (1960).
176. See Franklin, supra note 175; Letter from Jefferson to Monroe, 1797, in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 172 (Ford ed. 1896). Legislatures were authorized only
to enforce man's natural duties; Jefferson expressly rejected Hobbe's notion that man in
entering society gave up his natural rights. Letter from Jeffierson to Francis W. Gilmer,
June 7, 1816, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 31, 32 (Ford ed. 1899). The
Virginia Religious Toleration Act, which Jefferson authored, declared that any future act
tending to narrow its operation would be an infringement of a natural right. An Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom Passed in the Assembly of Virginia, 1786, in THOMAS
JEFFERSON ON DEamocRAcy 112-14 (Padover ed. 1939).
177. See JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA 293-95 (1782), reprinted in 3 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 263-64 (Ford ed. 1894); A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 237-39 (Ford ed. 1893) ; Letter from. Thomas Jeffer-
son to George Washington, 1792, in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRAcY 93 (Padover ed.
1939) ; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Pictet, 1803, id. at 94.
178. And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in
a free and open encounter. Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing.
Milton, Areopagitica, in THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM 1, 28 (Mayer ed. 1957). In Milton's
view good and evil are so mingled that knowledge of virtue cannot be gained without
knowledge of vice. The "scanning of error" Milton perceived to be necessary to "the con-
firmation of truth." Id. at 10-11.
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the social value of free and open discussion as the best means of discovering
and disseminating truth.1 79 This theory was developed and given its classic
statement by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. In his dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States,180 Holmes presented the argument. It is based upon
the observation that "time has upset many fighting faiths."'181 As a consequence,
men come to feel that "the best test of truth is the power of thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.' 18 2 That, stated
Holmes in a tone both ironic and hopeful, "at least" is the theory of the first
amendment; "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."'183 Developing the
"clear and present danger" exception to the absolute language of the first
amendment, Justice Brandeis, cast additional light on the market place theory.
Brandeis felt that underlying the first amendment was the belief that political
truth is essential to government, and that "freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery of political
truth. ... "184 Are there limits to this process; may speech be suppressed?
Yes, said Brandeis but only in an emergency, when it is too late to correct
error through discussion; only then does a "clear and present danger" exist
justifying suppression. The Founding Fathers, Brandeis asserted, had con-
fidence that reason, freely applied, would reach the truth; thus the remedy
for the correction of error is more speech, not enforced silence.185
These famous opinions-a dissent and a concurrence-have now become the
language of the majority of the Court. Sustaining an injunction against picket-
ing in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. 80 Justice
Frankfurter argued that back of free speech lay a faith in the power of an
appeal to reason. In a context of violence an utterance loses its significance
as an appeal to reason.'8 7 Similarly, he argued for sustaining group libel
laws because libelous and insulting words like the lewd and the obscene have
so little value as a step to truth as to be clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality. 8 8 Mr. Justice Black has also on occasion espoused
the market place theory; in Adler v. Board of Education,8 9 he said "Such a
179. See Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 620, 622
(1953). But the natural rights theory has not been entirely displaced. See Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936) ("the natural right ... to impart and ac-
quire information... "').
180. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
181. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 377.
186. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
187. Id. at 293.
188. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952).
189. 342 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
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governmental policy [freedom of the mind and spirit of man] encourages
varied intellectual outlooks in the belief that the best views will prevail."'19
This theory draws heavily on eighteenth century thought; it is consciously
modeled on Jefferson's stirring assertion that "if there be any among us would
wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let them stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.'"191 Indeed, both Holmes and
Brandeis present the market place theory not necessarily as their own view,
but as the view of the Founders, the "theory of our Constitution."' 92 In recent
times, however, it has been subjected to skeptical attacks. Among these are:
the assertion that all too frequently the desire of one side in a debate to "win
the game" overrides the desire to reach the truth; the observation that con-
centration of the mass media in a few hands distorts the functioning of
the market; and the fear that the multiplicity of arguments presented
today is greater than man's ability to assimilate them.193 These attacks, how-
ever, question the operation of the market only at the mechanical level where
correction is quite possible. They implicitly assume that if the market operated
at peak efficiency truth would be discovered, but they suggest that there
presently exists a partial disequilibrium which renders the market temporarily
incapable of correctly tabulating the results of free debate. Answers to these
attacks have been offered, 94 but the answers, like the questions, do not go
to the core of the problem. For a more fundamental skepticism questions the
190. Id. at 497 (Black J., dissenting).
191. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, in PADovER, THE COmPLETE
JEFFERSON 385 (1943).
192. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
193. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 103-04, 107-10 (1956); see MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 87-88 (1960):
The radio, as we now have it, is not cultivating those qualities of taste, of reasoned
judgment, of integrity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise
of self-government depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force for breaking them
down. It corrupts both our morals and our intelligence....
Emerson, An Essay on Freedom of Political Expression Today, 11 LAw. GUILD REV. 1, 3
(1951). The attacks on the market place theory which Chafee describes are taken from
Knight, Economic Theory and Nationalism, in THE ETHics OF COMPETITION AND OTHER
ESSAYS 277 (1935).
194. Chafee suggests, as a partial answer to the first objection, that the skeptic attack
misconceives the process of discussion. It is not like a debate in which we choose up sides.
Rather the process of public discussion through which viewpoints are changed is unsys-
tematic and consists in large part of "'a flying word from here and there." Chafee feels
that though reason may not be perfect it is better than any other tool of uncovering truth
that man has. He concludes that the reasoning process cannot work properly if govern-
ment prescribes which view is correct. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 110-12 (1956).
Emerson has suggested that "new forms of social control" may be used to solve the prob-
lem of monopolization of the media. Emerson, An Essay on Freedom of Political Expres-
sion Today, 11 LAw. GUILD REv. 1, 3 (1951).
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assumption made by both sides of the argument: that discussion-if it can
be free-will lead to truth.
The assertion that free discussion will lead to truth is unverifiable. In order
to judge whether progress toward truth has been made it is necessary to know
what is true. To prove that a society operating on the principle of free discussion
has progressed towards truth in the period of time T, to T2 , it would seem
necessary first to compare the total range of propositions thought true by a
consensus of the population at T, with the facts, 19 5 then make the same
evaluation of beliefs at T2 , and assess the relative degree of error between the
two times. If error had declined and truth increased, and factors unrelated to
legal treatment of free expression were found not to have contributed to that
change, it would be reasonable to assert that free discussion leads to truth.
There is a two-fold difficulty with such a process of measurement. First, what
weight is to be ascribed to varying degrees of error? It seems impossible to
rank errors for the purpose of determining whether rejection of one fallacy
for another reflected progress toward truth. Even assuming that such com-
parative levels of truth could be evaluated, however, a more fundamental
obstacle remains. The process of measurement requires a knowledge of what
the facts actually are. To prove that under the first amendment we as a nation
have progressed toward truth, we would have to show that our current beliefs
are more correct than those of 1789. This can be done in only two ways: either
the observer must assume that present beliefs are more true than those of
1789, or he must look to the "facts" and compare both views with this absolute
standard. The former assumes that very question which is to be proven ;190 the
latter flies in the face of the underlying premise of the market theory itself-
that experience has taught man that no matter how firmly he believes any
proposition to be true, there is a substantial possibility that it is untrue. Indeed,
the empirical evidence at man's disposal seems to indicate that the intellectual
history of mankind has been a procession of mutually inconsistent beliefs and
progression from one apparent error to another.197 The market place theory
is therefore unverifiable; it is thus little more than an elaborate metaphor. Its
inability to resolve the question, anonymity or disclosure, stems from the fact
that stripped of an empirical basis it is no more certain a guide to action or
evaluation than any other model or image.
A Pact with the Devil-An Alternative Theory of Free Speech
The observation that the market place theory is unverifiable, and that history
reflects only the diabolical process of one error replacing another, does not
195. Or, to say the same thing differently, to compare what is believed to be the case
by a consensus of the population at T, with what is the case.
196. I.e., that free discussion results in the replacement of erroneous judgments by
ones more correct.
197. Consider, for example, the procession of gods. See HAYDON, BIOGRAP Y OF THE
Gous 314-15, 317 (1941) ; authorities cited note 202 infra. See generally HAYDON =Pra.
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compel the conclusion that freedom of discussion is without a rational basis.
For a theory can be advanced which reaches conclusions substantially similar
to those of the classic case for free expression-the market place of ideas-but,
it is submitted, one which lacks the flaws of that thesis. The theory to be
proposed stems from the basic premise of the market place doctrine, the
fallibility of human judgment; however, it is an alternative and significantly
different formulation of the case for free expression. This reformulation, more-
over, may permit resolution of the question, disclosure or anonymity, which,
under the market place approach, leads only to an impasse.
The starting point of the proposed theory is the observation which for
Holmes was the starting point of the market place doctrine; "that time has
upset many fighting faiths."'198 Stated more precisely, if less colorfully, it is
the empirical observation that all normative judgments are highly uncertain.
Modern philosophers have recognized that no judgment is so certain, as to
exclude all possibility of error. 199 Even analytic a priori judgments-historical-
ly recognized as the most certain of all-may be erroneous. 200 The irreducible
human element in all judgment may make any single analytic a priori judgment
erroneous even in operations such as totalling a column of figures or the making
of a geometric proof. Empirical judgments too are suspect. Human inability
to evaluate all data relevant to decisions on matters such as the economic
superiority of capitalism or communism makes any final resolution of the
issue impossible. Modern physics has recognized this limit on human knowl-
edge and offers all its conclusions on future occurrences as statements of
probability.2 01 Doubts on questions of this nature, however, are directed at
the adequacy of the data, and therefore they may be resolvable by additional ob-
servation. More perplexing are questions as to the existence of God,20 2 or the na-
ture of knowledge 2 03-questions which new evidence can never settle.20 4 And
198. See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
199. This in the sense that no matter how certain judgments may seem there remains
the logical possibility that they may be erroneous. See AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
35-44 (1956). See generally WISDOM, OTHER MINDS 131-91 (1952).
200. See AYER, op. cit. supra note 199, at 41-44. The certainty spoken of in these areas
is not the certainty of a particular person at a particular time but rather the fact that if
an a priori proposition is true then it must be true. See ibid. But this is a point which only
recently came to the attention of philosophers.
201. MARGENAU, OPEN VISTAS 176-77, 184 (1961). See generally THE RISE oF ScIEN-
TIFIC PHILoSOPHY (1951).
202. Some of the most serious persecutions of ideas have been persecutions for belief
in false gods. See, e.g., BAINToN, TRIvAn. OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 33-94 (1958); Canfield,
The Early Persecutions of the Christians, in 55 COLUMBIA UNIVERSrTY, STUDIES IN HIS-
TORY, EcONOMICS AND PUBuC LAW 451 (1913); HOLMES, CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION OF
NoN-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY (1946). Few beliefs are followed
with greater fanaticism and few believed with greater conviction. Yet throughout history
men have adhered to different gods and continue to do so today.
203. See generally AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE (1956).
204. Rather these are questions of how data already possessed by man can be assessed
most fittingly. See id. at 1-5; WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PsYcHo-ANAALySIs 156-59 (1957).
And on these questions the debate goes on endlessly. See id. at 181.
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normative judgments-moral and ethical beliefs and counsels based on them 205
-are particularly open to doubt. The moral beliefs of one era are overturned
by those of another: in time the new faith yields to a third. Slavery, imperi-
alism, aryan supremacy, social darwinism each have had their day. And many
quite different creeds, each of which is believed by its adherents to be the only
right one, exist in the world today.206 Nor is this process surprising. Many
normative judgments involve decisions on cause and effect which are more apt
to be erroneous than decisions based on direct observation.2 0 7 Indeed some
ethical theories make the evaluation of an action depend on its total con-
sequences through history.208 While the physical sciences deal with particular
aspects of the world, there is no aspect which is generally regarded as irrele-
vant to normative judgment. Motivation,2 0 9 consequences, 210 and the entire
personal character 211 have seemed relevant to different moralists. Finally,
no general agreement has ever been reached on a method for arriving at
particular ethical judgments.
212
All normative judgments are thus highly uncertain. Yet action seems to re-
quire at least some modicum of certainty; for to take a given course of conduct
is necessarily to assert, at least, that that course is no worse than any other
205. For a fuller and more precise description of the range of normative discourse see
NOWELL-SmITH, ETHICS (1954).
206. Some believe that a country's economic development should be left in the hands
of private individuals, while others believe that all major industries should be state run.
Some in this country believe it highly desirable that the world unite under one govern-
ment. Another segment believes with equal fervor that nothing worse could be imagined.
The desirability of an unrestricted press is still a live issue. U.S. News & World Report,
Oct. 17, 1960, p. 73. The questions which divide us could be multipled many times.
207. See Feigl, Notes on Causality, in READINGS IN TICE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
408, 417 (Feigl & Brodbeck ed. 1953). See also HumEs, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Selby-Biggs ed. 1894).
208. See BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 70 (New ed. 1823);
Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 895, 904
(Burtt ed. 1939) ; MOORE, ETHICS 140 (1912).
209. Butler, Sermons, in BRITISH MORALISTS 246-47 (Selby-Biggs ed. 1897); HUME,
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 472 (Selby-Biggs ed. 1888) ; KANT, CRITIQUE or PRACTICAL
REASON 164-82 (6th ed. Abbott transl. 1909).
210. See authorities cited at note 234 infra; cf. MACHIAVELLI, The Prince, in THE
PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 3-102 (1950).
211. See Plato, Gorgias, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 505, 568-69 (Jowett ed. 1892);
WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 225-26 (1957).
212. Is, as Butler suggested, the conscience the guide? See Butler, Sermons, in BRITISH
MORALISTS 221 (Selby-Biggs ed. 1897). Or writings of a Mohammed or a Christ? Or the
pronouncements of some institution such as the Communist Party or the Roman Catholic
Church? Or should human conduct be guided by a hedonistic calculus, as suggested by
Bentham and Mill? See BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 29-32 (New
ed. 1823); Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL
895, 904 (Burtt ed. 1939). Or by weighing the considerations pro and con in the light of
some unquestionable first principle?
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available course.2 13 Thus to engage in endless and purposeless debate-to
refuse to act-is entirely consistent with the recognition of uncertainty. But
non-neurotic man, realizing that uncertainty can never be eliminated, does in
fact act. This does not indicate that non-neurotic man always acts inconsistently
with the recognition of uncertainty. For a certain class of acts may be as con-
sistent with the recognition of uncertainty as endless neurotic debate is.
214
The only class of acts, however, which may be consistent with the recognition
of uncertainty, are those which implicitly recognize that they are based on
uncertain normative judgments. Any act which cuts off the continuing discus-
sion of normative questions, however, implicity asserts that the normative
judgments upon which it is based are certain and such an act is therefore in-
consistent with the recognition of uncertainty. Since any act which has the
effect of cutting off the discussion is inconsistent with the recognition of uncer-
tainty, the only class of acts which is justified--consistent with the recognition
of uncertainty-is that class which does not foreclose the possibility of mod-
ification of beliefs; for only through modification of beliefs can error ever be
corrected. This is not to assert that man may not choose to act irrationally; it
is merely to assert that if man does choose to act rationally he must not act
so as to preclude the modification of beliefs. And since only acts which do not
preclude the modification of beliefs are rational, to reject the proposition that
one ought not act so as to preclude the modification of beliefs is to choose
irrationality.21
213. On the relativistic view of ethics while it would not be true of any course of con-
duct that it was better than any other, it would be true that a given course of conduct was.
no worse than any other.
214. Some existentialists would agree that human judgment was highly uncertain and
that to take a given path is to assert that that path is no worse than any other. They de-
part from the analysis presented in drawing from these premises the relativistic thesis that
all action is unjustified, which serves as the basis for their further assertion that all action
is an irrational leap of faith. Cf. CAmus, THE MYTH OF SisypHus 49-55 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. ed. 1955). But, as has been suggested, man is not unjustified in acting. Men often have
reasons for acting in their normative beliefs and these normative beliefs though uncertain are
the best reasons men can have. To analogize uncertain reasons to an absence of reasons is
mistaken. And to insist on the standard of certainty is to insist on a standard that could
not possibly be met. "[Ilt is perverse to see tragedy in what could not conceivably be other-
wise. . . ." AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 41 (1956). Thus what the skeptical attack
shows is the futility of demanding and waiting for certainty-not the absence of any rational
base for action. Compare the treatment given by Ayer and Wisdom to the problem of know-
ing the mind of another. While A cannot know the mind of B in the way B does, it does
not follow A has no basis for saying he knows the mind of B. A may base his claim to know
on B's demeanor, the physiological resemblances between A and B, and even upon telep-
athy. AYER, THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 243-54 (1956) ; W soM, OTHER MINDS 207-11,
216-17 (1952). Of course, any action which could be justified only if a criterion of certainty
were met must remain unjustified.
215. The proposition "it is not the case that it is wrong to take an act which cuts off
the possibility of correcting mistaken beliefs" has been shown to be unjustifiable on every
possible ethical viewpoint. From this it does not follow logically that "it is wrong, etc."
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It is as if the realization of the fallibility of ethical judgment forces all who
desire to act rationally to make a pact with the Devil. In return for the justi-
fication of acting on judgments that well may be erroneous, he must bind him-
self to leave open the possibility of modification of belief. Any act foreclosing
modification of beliefs violates the terms of the contract; it is a breach of
faith with the guiding principle of uncertainty.
The obligation to take no action foreclosing the modification of beliefs
is, at least, an obligation not to suppress the free communication of ideas. 210
For the process of modifying beliefs proceeds, at least in part, by communica-
tion. The market place theory assumes that rational debate is the major source
of such change.217 It may be argued, however, that verbal communication is
not the chief factor in the change of normative beliefs. Irrational factors un-
doubtedly affect the process; however, it seems clear that speech plays a
necessary if not a sufficient role.2 18 Since the free communication of ideas is
necessary to modify beliefs, its suppression is a violation of the unholy compact.
Thus this alternative theory of free expression ends, as it began, in sub-
stantial accord with the market place theory, for both conclude that the sup-
pression of the free communication of ideas is not justified. While these
theories begin from the same premise and reach similar conclusions, there are
substantial differences in the reasons underlying the conclusions. The market
place theory builds from the empirical proposition that the best test of the
truth of any proposition is its ability to withstand the competition of the
market.2 19 Like the assertion that discussion leads to truth, however, this
proposition is unverifiable ;220 moreover, it is of dubious empirical value.2 2 1
Secondly, the market place theory asserts that truth ought to be sought as
But when the best possible reasons for asserting a proposition have been given, no more
can be done even though the reasons given may not be conclusive. See WISDOM, PHULoso-
PHY AND PsYcno-AxA YsIs 171-74 (1957).
216. This is not to say that action having the effect of curtailing speech is always in-
consistent with the recognition that speech is essential to the modification of beliefs. It
would be difficult if not impossible to maintain that any particular speech was essential to
this process. But to suppress communication solely because of the beliefs communicated, or
to suppress any given speech for a reason that would permit the suppressing of all speech
does negate the possibility of modifying beliefs.
217. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 & n.3 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring); CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS oF LIBERTY 110 (1956). This assumption is, however,
gratuitous; in fairness it must be pointed out that the market place theory need show only
that free discussion leads to truth-not how it achieves that result.
218. See DE LAGUNA, SPEECH: ITS FUNCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 327-29, 341-43
(1927) ; EVANS, INTRODUCTION TO STUDIES IN COMMUNICATION 5 (1955) ; MORRIs, SIGNS,
LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR 204-10 (1946). The appendix to ORWELL, 1984, 227-37 (Signet
ed. 1949) contains a valuable exposition of the effect of language on belief. For an instruc-
tive model of the part played by discussion in belief modification see CaAFEE, THE BLESS-
INGS OF LIBERTY 110-11 (1956).
219. See text accompanying note 182 .supra.
220. " See text accompanying note 196 mtpra.
221. See text accompanying note 197 supra.
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the safest guide to conduct.222 From these propositions is derived the norma-
tive proposition that a free competitive market of ideas ought to be maintained.
The alternative theory, however, rejects these notions as unverifiable. It
attempts to establish an argument, against the suppression of free expression
the empirical basis of which-the uncertainty of normative judgments-is
verifiable.2 3 Moreover, this view differs from the market place analysis in re-
jecting the proposition that reason will produce truth if discussion is left
free. Rather the suppression of any conduct essential to the correction of error
is unjustified under this analysis regardless of whether that conduct is directed
to reason or to man's irrational aspects.
224
The philosophical argument against the suppression of any form of free
expression is extremely broad; it includes any conduct which may be necessary
to modify beliefs. The first amendment, however, is far narrower; it protects
only speech, press, religion and assembly.
Conclusion: Disclosure or Anonymity?
Armed with this analysis of free expression it is possible to return to the
problem posed at the outset; is disclosure or anonymity more compatible with
the goals of the first amendment? Under the market place theory, this problem
admits of no solution; under the case for free expression proposed in this
Comment, it is submitted, a choice may be made. Before considering the
legal question disclosure or anonymity?, however, it is necessary to relate
the preceding philosophical analysis to the legal norm of the Constitution as
viewed by the Supreme Court.
222. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
223. The argument is rooted in no one ethical system. The statements it makes are
statements about all ethical systems; the assertion that suppression of conduct essential to
the correction of error is never justified is a metaethical proposition-a statement about
normative discourse as opposed to a normative statement. Rejecting the notion that free
speech ought to be maintained because it leads to truth as unverifiable, the alternative
theory reasons from the empirical proposition that normative judgment is highly uncertain
to the metaethical proposition that conduct essential to the correction of error is never
justified. On the basis of this metaethical proposition the theory asserts that conduct essen-
tial to the correction of error ought not to be suppressed. On the basis of the further em-
pirical proposition that communication is necessary to the modification of beliefs and hence
to the correction of errors a subsidiary normative proposition is derived: that the expres-
sion of ideas ought not to be suppressed.
224. If it could be shown that there were contexts in which violence was necessary
to the modification of beliefs, then society would be unjustified in suppressing violence in
those contexts, since any normative belief condemning violence would be too uncertain to
provide a basis for taking action which would cut off the possibility of modifying belief.
This does not mean that the first amendment ever protects violence. While the conclusion
that the suppression of violence is unjustified where violence is essential to the modification
of belief is drawn from the same basis as the conclusion that the suppression of beliefs is
unjustified, violence is not speech. While the basis of the protection of speech may be help-
ful in determining the scope of the language, of the amendment, the Court can only protect
conduct which might reasonably be said to fall within the language of the amendment.
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The Court has never adopted any single rationale for the protection of free
speech ;225 it has however favored one of several formulations of the market
place theory, each of which lays stress on a different aspect of free speech. 220
One such statement bears some similarity to the theory presented in this Com-
ment. This statement, which at one time or other was articulated by Jefferson,
Brandeis, and Murphy, stresses the necessary role of reason in the correction of
error, rather than in the attainment of truth.227 Of course, there are significant
differences between this aspect of the market place theory and that developed
in this Comment; the chief of these being that it seems to lack the scepticism
implicit in the "compact with the Devil" thesis. However, it suggests that
adoption of the latter theory would not represent a significant departure from
the traditional concept of the value of speech, but a reformulation of that con-
cept in light of the teachings of certain schools of contemporary philosophy.2 2 8
It is thus possible to return to the question orginally posed: should anony-
mity receive constitutional protection? On the basis of the preceding analysis
two answers to this question may be offered. The first of these stems from
the relationship between the anonymity cases such as Talley and the earlier
225. Both the natural rights theory and the market place theory have been given
parallel recognition. Compare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936)
("the natural right ... to impart and acquire information... ."), with Milkwagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (market place theory). And
in many cases the court has not articulated any theoretical basis for decision. E.g., Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
226. Underlying the view of Brandeis that speech should only be suppressed when the
danger was immediate lay the view that given time for discussion good ideas would correct
bad. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In
contrast Vinson in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), while adhering to the
view that "free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies," id. at 503,
adopted a view of the clear and present danger test that substituted for the requirement
that the danger be immediate, a test which excluded immediacy from consideration. Id. at
510.
227. "Reason and free inquiry," said Jefferson, "are the only effectual agents against
error." JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 293 (1782), reprinted in 3 WarINGS
oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 263 (Ford ed. 1894) (emphasis added). Similarly, Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. California stressed that one function of speech is to "free men from
the bondage of irrational fears," and to expose falsehood and fallacy by discussion. 274
U.S. 357, 376 (1927). This statement of the role of free speech in correcting erroneous
doctrines which may gain currency was clearly articulated by Justice Murphy in Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, when he said that "abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press,
however, impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective
exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government."
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
228. John Stuart Mill, whose writings have deeply affected the development of the
American understanding of free speech, see CHAFEE, FREE SPEacH IN THE UNITED STATES
30 (1941), advanced arguments similar to those presented here. Mill based his case for free
expression on the dual proposition that: "We can never be sure that the opinion we are
endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion" and that silencing the expression of opinion elimi-
nates the opportunity "of exchanging error for truth." MILL, ON LIBERTY 36 (1863).
1122 [Vol. 70 :1084
RIGHT TO ANONYMITY
cases invalidating subsequent punishment of speech on the ground that it, like
prior restraint, deterred the expression of ideas. It was suggested that since
disclosure may in like manner deter speech, no distinction should be made
between disclosure and subsequent punishment.22 9 The following counter-argu-
ment was raised against this assertion: disclosure may promote the discovery
of truth, by permitting the choice between competing ideas to be made on
complete information; it therefore advances the goal of the first amendment.
23 0
But an analysis of the market place theory led to the conclusion that, due to
the unverifiable character of that thesis, no resolution of the dilemma could
be offered. 231 Under the theory of this Comment, however, the argument that
disclosure is consistent with the promotion of truth is irrelevant since the pro-
motion of truth is not the justification of free expression. There is, therefore,
no valid justification for disclosure, and since it admittedly has some deterrent
effect on free expression, it is constitutionally indistinguishable from subse-
quent punishment.
The theory of free expression presented by this Comment supports a con-
stitutional right of anonymity on grounds independent of the subsequent
punishment cases. Disclosure laws frequently deter expression;232 they espe-
cially curb criticism of established belief and ideas.23 3 Thus, unless it can be
positively demonstrated that such laws themselves are sometimes essential to
the modification of beliefs, they conflict with the pact with the devil-that one
ought to take no act which cuts off the possibility of modifying beliefs. The
laws themselves-compulsory disclosure against the will of the proponent of
modification-and not the fact of disclosure must be demonstrably essential to
modification. It should be recalled that under the proposed theory, constant
modification of beliefs, regardless of whether such modification is in the direc-
tion of truth or error, is essential. Although a legislature may be able best
to judge whether disclosure or anonymity will most effectually promote truth,
presumably the proponent of modification can best judge whether disclosure
or anonymity will most effectively cause a desired modification to occur. If
this is so, then it follows that the proponent should have the absolute right to
make the decision whether or not to disclose. It may be argued, however, that
the legislature, even when modification not truth is the goal, can best judge
whether disclosure or anonymity will bring about a general climate in which
modification is most likely to be encouraged. Thus if the legislature made an
accurate determination that a certain disclosure law would not deter essential
expression but would help the modification of beliefs, it certainly would be
justified in enacting such a law. (The law, however, would have little, if any,
effect in terms of compulsion, since any reasonable proponent under such
circumstances would disclose anyhow.) If the legislature made an accurate
229. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 162-66 supra.
231. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
232. See text accompanying notes 139-49 supra.
233. See text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
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finding that a certain law would deter essential expression and would not,
in any other way, help modification, it would, of course, be unjustified in
enacting such a law, regardless of its judgment concerning the promotion of
truth. If, however, the legislature made an accurate finding that a certain dis-
closure law would deter certain essential expression but at the same time
would itself be essential to the modification of beliefs, arguably, the legislature
would be justified in compelling such disclosure. But it is unlikely that any
compulsory disclosure requirement which deterred speech essential to the
modification of beliefs, would itself be essential to the modification of beliefs.
Additionally, long experience has indicated that the proponents of modification
and not the legislature--almost by definition opponents of at least some types
of modification-will be more genuinely interested in securing modification of
beliefs; it would thus be foolish to permit the legislature to compel the propo-
nents to perform an act which it felt was essential to the modification of beliefs.
Limitations upon the Constitutional Right of Anonymity
The right of anonymity is not absolute. Inherent in the theory of the right are
two varieties of limitations. First, the scope of the right is limited by its rationale
-deterrence. Unless a disclosure provision is likely to deter the expression of
ideas either because a potential advocate fears reprisals or desires to avoid
publicity, it does not infringe the constitutional right. Secondly, since the
constitutional right to anonymity derives solely from the first amendment,
those limitations which inhere in the first amendment obviously limit the right
of anonymity. Thus, in those circumstances in which a speaker could con-
stitutionally be silenced by direct governmental action, he could also be silenced
by a disclosure provision.
Since the right of anonymity is a derivative of first and fourteenth amendment
rights of freedom of expression and association it extends only as far as those
protections extend. Even if deterrence is found, therefore, a court must also
ask whether the speech or association deterred is protected by the first amend-
ment. The court has developed several tests to separate unconstitutional from
constitutional curtailments of utterances. First, a court has to determine
whether the content communicated is "speech" in the first amendment sense.234
234. The demand "Buy" is the promotion of a product-not the expression of an idea
or belief. Compare Valentine v. Christenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting "purely commercial advertising") (applied to ad to see submarine), with Jame-
son v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witness for dis-
tributing hindbill advertising sale of religious literature). Several distinctions may be
drawn between a commercial advertisement and the expression of an idea. In Valentine
the purpose was commercial, the function of the handbill profit making; in Jameson the
purpose was clearly religious and the money-raising aspect ancillary. The communications
are also distinguished by a difference in the breadth of the subject matter, the extent of
the result sought. The paradigm of the commercial advertisement is limited in that it urges
some specific act by recipients of the communication-e.g., to attend an exhibition-and
no more; the paradigm of the expression of an idea is the expression of a social, religious
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If the communication is protected, the court must then decide whether the
curtailment of expression is only incidental to the regulation of a regulable
nonspeech aspect of communication 235 and whether the curtailment is no
broader than is necessary.236 If those conditions are met the statute is con-
stitutional. But even if the governmental action is a direct regulation of speech,
the action may still be validated by showing, under one of several tests, a
likelihood that the speech will result in illegal conduct.
23 7
The factors determining whether or not the communication or association
in question is protected by the first amendment are many and complex; they
are no more relevant to the right of anonymity than to any other first amend-
ment right; detailed analysis of these factors will therefore not be attempted
here. But the relationship between disclosure and deterrence, a relationship
which is of particular relevance to the right of anonymity, will be considered
in detail.
Deterrence
Since a finding of deterrence is an essential precondition to the invocation
of the right, the question of how deterrence is determined is crucial. Several
problems face a court attempting to decide whether a given disclosure law
will, in fact, deter free expression. First, does it matter whether the disclosures
must be made to the public or need they only be made to a governmental official?
Laws requiring disclosure of information to governmental officials, where the
information is placed on open file, have been considered no less violative of
the first amendment than requirements of public disclosure.238 Identity of
or economic philosophy. The nature of the arguments presented in a commercial advertise-
ment-where there are arguments in the customary sense of that word-tend to differentiate
it from any typical "expression of an idea." Advertisements typically take the form of a
demand that an individual buy a product and the arguments used are typically directed to
the advantages that come to the individual from buying it. Finally, the social importance
of the communication-the scope and nature of the beliefs affected--distinguishes argu-
ments in the election of a President from arguments urging the purchase of a brand of
automobile quite irrespective of the nature of the arguments presented. While particular
instances of the communications of ideas may not differ from commercial advertising in all
of these ways, they resemble one another in each possessing some of those distinguishing
characteristics even though not in all cases the same ones. Compare WITTGENSTEIN, PHIL-
OSOPHICAL INvESTiGATION S 31e-32e (2d ed. 1958). Similarly the Court has held obscenity
not to be speech in the first amendment sense. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85
(1957).
235. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Mabee v. White Plains Publish-
ing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
236. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960) ; Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
237. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).
238. Compare Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (affidavit to be filed with board
of trustees), Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (list of members and con-
tributors to be filed with city clerk), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (regis-
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treatment seems sensible, for information on open file would be available to
all those wishing to take reprisals; those sufficiently in opposition to views
to take reprisals against the exponents of those views are likely also to be
sufficiently interested to look up the names of their advocates. A very different
problem-a problem on which the Court has yet to pass-would be presented
if the required information were kept from the public. In such a case any likeli-
hood of deterrence would depend in part on the opportunity for government
officials to use the disclosures as a basis for governmental discrimina-
tion,23 9 in part on the likelihood that the information would be leaked to
those wishing to take reprisals, and in part on the probability of a change in
government from one friendly to the proposed view to one antagonistic to
the proposed view. The second problem posed by the deterrence requirement
concerns the standards a court should apply to determine the existence of
deterrence. The Court might first apply an "objective" test: when faced with
an attack on the constitutionality of a given disclosure law it would ask whether
it was likely that this law would keep any individuals or groups from ex-
pressing ideas. If so, the law would be found unconstitutional; if not, the
court could then apply one or more "subjective tests." It could focus solely on
the individual or organization contesting the statute or requirement and
determine whether the law had a deterrent effect upon them. To answer this
question, a court might use several tests. Because of the paramount impor-
tance of the right of free expression,240 it might presume deterrence and re-
quire the state to rebut this presumption. Or, the protestant might be required
tration with Secretary of State), with Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (disclosure
on face of handbill). Similarly the early cases sustaining disclosure requirements involved
both varieties. Compare Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1912) (disclosure
statement to be published as well as filed with Postmaster General), with New York ex
rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (membership list to be filed with Secretary
of State).
239. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) ("[T]he pressure upon a teacher
to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny would
be constant and heavy.") ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 57 (1953) ("Some will
fear to read . . . what the powers-that-be dislike.") (Douglas, J., concurring).
240. The court has frequently said that the freedom of expression enjoys a "preferred
position." E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529-30 (1945) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position."). See Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum) ; Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr.
Justice Stone and "Preferred Freedoms," 65 YALE L.J. 597, 598-601, 625-28 (1956) ; see,
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526 (1951); BLAck, THE PEOPLE AND THE
COURT 111-12 (1960) ; Cohn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamental Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1, 13-16 (1958). But see Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts,
65 Hagv. L. REv. 47-50 (1951). Unless justified, a governmental act which has the effect
of curtailing expression is invalid. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1958). But here the




to prove that he was deterred. 24 ' At this point, the court would have to decide
whether all deterrence, even if proved, should receive constitutional protection.
Individuals might be deterred by unreasonable fears flowing from imagined
dangers. A court might find this response beyond the threshold of constitution-
al protection; yet the impact of the disclosure requirement on free expression
in such a case is as great as if actual sanctions were applied.242
The "objective" test, looking to the import of the disclosure requirement
on the generality of persons affected by it, seems the most desirable starting
point for judicial evaluation of deterrence. This test makes the effect of the
statute on the party before the court initially irrelevant. If the court finds that
there is a likelihood that someone will be deterred by this requirement it will
declare it void regardless of the law's impact on the protestants. This approach
might be criticized because it permits a party to raise as a defense the con-
stitutional rights of another. In most constitutional areas, this criticism would
defeat the proposed test, for its application would violate the well established
rule that no one has standing to raise another's constitutional rights.243 In the
area of the first amendment, however, the Court does not adhere strictly to
this rule; rather, it frequently tests the constitutionality of a law "on its face,"
not necessarily as applied to the case at bar.244 Thus in Thornhill v. Alabama
the Court invalidated a blanket prohibition of picketing without determining
whether on the evidence a conviction could be supported on a more narrowly
drawn prohibition. 245 And in Talley, the court followed this approach by
striking a disclosure law without any inquiry into the law's effect on Talley
himself and despite the fact that no proof of deterrence was offered.
2 46
241. Evidence of deterrence was offered in both of the NAACP cases.
242. Anonymity deserves protection not for the sake of the speaker but to prevent the
curtailment of expression. Compare Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53 CoLum.
L. REv. 620, 622 (1953).
243. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953) ; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S.
571 (1915) ; New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907); see ROBERT-
SON & KIRKHAM, JURIsDIcTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 298
(1951). This rule should be but has not always been carefully distinguished from the con-
stitutional requirement of a case or controversy. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (discussing cases and drawing distinction).
244. E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (license tax for sale of re-
ligious literature); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940) (statute banning all
picketing) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (licensing statute) ; see Bernard,
Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the
First Anicodinent, 50 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1951).
245. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940) ; accord, Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106 (1910).
246. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) ; accord, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960). A final problem posed by the need to prove deterrence is whether the judge
or the jury should determine the likelihood of deterrence. Resolution of this question is
unlike the usual finding of fact, for it will determine not whether the activity in question
was violative of the statute, but whether the statute itself was constitutional. In this respect
the determination of the existence of deterrence is like the determination of the existence
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Under the proposed system, therefore, a court would first have to determine
if the communication in question was protected by the first amendment. If
it was so protected it would next have to determine whether the disclosure
law in question would have the effect of deterring the generality of persons
who might be affected by it. If the law would probably have this effect, it
would be struck down on its face. If it would not have this effect, the court
would then have to determine whether the law did in fact have a deterrent
effect upon the particular defendant. If it did have this effect, it would be
struck down, not on its face, but only as applied to the particular defendant.
2 47
The courts would thereby be acting consistently with the recognition of nor-
mative uncertainty; it would be voiding legislative action which might have
the effect of foreclosing the modification of at least some beliefs.
of a clear and present danger which a plurality of the court in Dewtisr felt to be an issue
for the judge. 'Whether the first amendment protects the activity which constitutes the
violation of the statute must depend upon a judicial determination of the scope of the first
amendment applied to the circumstances of the case." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 513 (1951). Just how likely deterrence need be to justify invalidating a statute as an
abridgement of free speech is a question of the scope of the first amendment.
247. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (ordinance tested only in
application to NAACP). In Poulos the licensing scheme held valid on its face was said to
have been invalidly applied when Poulos was denied a license. Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953) (dictum).
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